Digital Expungement by Haber, Eldar
Maryland Law Review
Volume 77 | Issue 2 Article 3
Digital Expungement
Eldar Haber
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Internet Law Commons, and the Law and Society
Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
77 Md. L. Rev. 337 (2018)
  
337 
DIGITAL EXPUNGEMENT 
ELDAR HABER* 
INTRODUCTION 
Criminal procedures usually carry collateral consequences.1  Upon re-
joining society, individuals with a criminal history often face governmental 
and social restrictions on housing, employment, and educational opportuni-
ties, along with a revocation of other civic rights.2  Reintegration of indi-
viduals with criminal histories into society—in an effort to increase the 
chances of rehabilitation and reduce recidivism—necessitates granting them 
a fresh start.  Individuals capable of being reformed need their criminal his-
tories to be treated as though they never existed.  To achieve such a pur-
pose, many policymakers introduced the concept of expungement: a legal 
process by which criminal history records are later vacated, reversed, 
sealed, purged, or destroyed by the state.3  While jurisdictional variations 
exist both in terminology and scope, expungement legislation is generally 
similar in effect: reformed individuals with certain types of criminal histo-
ries can file a request to seal or even destroy their criminal records, which 
in turn, usually remain available only to governmental agencies under lim-
ited circumstances.4 
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 1.  Collateral consequences in criminal law usually refer to any indirect consequences from 
criminal convictions.  For more on collateral consequences, see infra note 31. 
 2.  See infra Part II. 
 3.  See infra note 57. 
 4.  See James A.R. Nafziger & Michael Yimesgen, The Effect of Expungement on Remova-
bility of Non-Citizens, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 915, 917 (2003).  Notably, there is some differ-
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Prior to the emergence of digital technology, expungement worked ra-
ther well.  While an expunged criminal history could have lived on through 
“public memory, newspapers or the activities of private investigators,”5 its 
impact was rather limited: if one’s records were expunged, one would have 
largely been treated by the public as if one never had a record in the first 
place.  However, digital technology changed the nature of expungement.6  
Digital technology enabled the gathering or purchasing of criminal records 
in bulk from governmental agencies, the assembling of databases of these 
records, and the reselling of them without differentiating between criminal 
history records that were expunged and those that were not.7 
While such practices can be regulated, regulation could be insufficient 
in an age where information is widely available online.  It has become high-
ly difficult—if not virtually impossible—to conceal one’s wrongdoing once 
it is accessible and searchable online.  The fact that the internet is capable 
of remembering everything makes expungement statutes ineffective in the 
digital era.8  For many individuals,9 expunging official government records 
becomes meaningless as long as the individual’s wrongdoing appears online 
via a simple search of his or her name.  Expungement will not eliminate the 
visibility of criminal histories to potential employers, landlords, educational 
facilities, or any other interested party as long as they appear online.10  In 
other words, these individuals are doomed to always wear a scarlet letter. 
There are both legal and pragmatic barriers to expungement in the 
digital era.  It might be technically impossible to effectively expunge in-
formation in the digital age, and expungement is legally challenging, as 
granting individuals a right to compel private companies to expunge their 
records is a constraint on freedom of speech, freedom of information, and 
the freedom of the press.  Furthermore, as this Article shows, the risk to re-
habilitation in the digital era is highly jurisdictional in nature and mainly 
                                                          
ence between expunged records and sealed records.  Unlike sealed records, expunged records 
must be physically destroyed by each entity or person in possession of the record.  See Joshua 
Gaines, Dissecting the REDEEM Act, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR.  (June 30, 2015), 
http://ccresourcecenter.org/2015/06/30/dissecting-the-redeem-act/#more-5132.  For further expla-
nation of these differences, see infra Part II. 
 5.  See R. Paul Davis, Records of Arrest and Conviction: A Comparative Study of Institu-
tional Abuse, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 863, 863–64 (1980) (footnote omitted) (citing V. PACKARD, 
THE NAKED SOCIETY (1964)). 
 6.  Strikingly, back in 1980, Paul Davis argued that the “advent of computer storage” 
showed “the greatest potential for longevity” of criminal history records.  See id. at 864. 
 7.  See infra Part III.A. 
 8.  See infra Part III. 
 9.  The potential online availability of expunged records does not necessarily mean that eve-
ry individual’s wrongdoing will appear online via a simple search of their name.  One reason is 
that using name identifiers could lead to many results, as some names are more often used than 
others (John Smith, for example). 
 10.  See infra note 44. 
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impacts U.S. citizens.  Many foreign jurisdictions do not treat criminal his-
tory records as public information, and even if information finds its way to 
the market or the internet, individuals possess the ability to remove ex-
punged records.  Are American expungement statutes obsolete in the digital 
age?11  Does the digital era—or the “information age”—change the rele-
vance of rehabilitation by expungement?  Could and should U.S. policy-
makers acknowledge a property right in information or a right of reputa-
tion?12  And finally, what are the legal, social, and technological challenges 
of ensuring digital expungement in the United States? 
This Article examines these and other questions by scrutinizing the in-
tersection of criminal law and digital technology in the context of rehabili-
tation.  It proceeds as follows: Parts I and II examine rehabilitation and ex-
pungement in criminal law; Part III explores the challenges of digital 
technology to rehabilitation measures; and Part IV evaluates and discusses 
potential ex ante and ex post measures that could enable rehabilitation in the 
digital age.  It argues that while most ex post measures are either unconsti-
tutional or unrealistic for enabling digital expungement, ex ante measures—
namely, changing the perception of criminal history records as public rec-
ords—could become the only viable solution.  Accordingly, this Part sug-
gests implementing a graduated approach towards the public nature of crim-
inal history records, which would be narrowly tailored to serve the interests 
of rehabilitation-by-expungement.  Finally, Part V concludes the discussion 
and warns against the current reluctance to acknowledge the importance of 
digital rehabilitation. 
I.  REHABILITATION 
In pre-modern times, criminal convictions carried very harsh penalties 
that would cause civil disabilities.  One of the earliest examples is the Mid-
dle Ages’ penalty of outlawry, which cast out offenders from civil society 
by depriving them of any civil rights and placed them outside of legal pro-
tection.13  Offenders were no longer considered members of their household 
                                                          
 11.  Cf. Martin Kaste, Digital Data Make for a Really Permanent Record, NPR (Oct. 29, 
2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=114276194&sc=emaf (“There’s no 
such thing as privacy of criminal records anymore.”). 
 12.  For more on the right to be forgotten/right of erasure in the EU, see infra notes 152–153.  
For more on the future of reputation in the digital era, see DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF 
REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE INTERNET (2007). 
 13.  For an in-depth inquiry into outlawry, see generally OUTLAWS IN MEDIEVAL AND EARLY 
MODERN ENGLAND: CRIME, GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY, C. 1066–C. 1600 (John C. Appleby & 
Paul Dalton eds., 2009). 
 340 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:337 
 
or society and lost all their possessions.14  Their lives were considered so 
worthless that even murdering them carried impunity.15 
Times have changed.  Modern societies acknowledge the importance 
of rehabilitation, considering it one of the main objectives of penal policy 
and sentencing.16  One of the primary rationales behind rehabilitation is to 
transform individuals with criminal history17 into law-abiding citizens to aid 
them in reintegrating into society and to reduce recidivism.18  To ensure re-
habilitation, many policymakers have discussed at length ways to improve 
housing options, employment prospects, access to healthcare, and the po-
tential for family reunification to ensure the social reintegration of criminal 
offenders after rejoining society.19 
But sometime in the 1970s, the U.S. approach to criminal sanctioning 
shifted towards models emphasizing retribution and incapacitation.20  Both 
Congress and state legislators criminalized more conduct and increased 
both monetary and nonmonetary criminal sanctions for existing offenses.21  
This so-called “tough on crime” approach resulted in near zero-tolerance 
                                                          
 14.  Mirjan R. Damaska, Adverse Legal Consequences of Conviction and Their Removal: A 
Comparative Study, 59 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 347, 350 (1968) (describing the 
history of outlawry). 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  The common five objectives of criminal law are retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, 
rehabilitation, and restoration.  See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 409, 
414–15 (2000); Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A Retro-
spective on the Past Century and Some Thoughts About the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003). 
 17.  Criminal history records are defined by the U.S. Code as “information collected by crim-
inal justice agencies on individuals consisting of identifiable descriptions and notations of arrests, 
detentions, indictments, or other formal criminal charges, and any disposition arising therefrom, 
including acquittal, sentencing, correctional supervision, or release.”  42 U.S.C. § 14616(b)(4)(A) 
(2012). 
 18.  See PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAW WITHOUT JUSTICE: WHY 
CRIMINAL LAW DOESN’T GIVE PEOPLE WHAT THEY DESERVE 117 (2006); JEREMY TRAVIS, BUT 
THEY ALL COME BACK: FACING THE CHALLENGES OF PRISONER REENTRY 87–88 (2005) (de-
scribing challenges of prisoner reentry).  For a study on recidivism, see PATRICK A. LANGAN & 
DAVID J. LEVIN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 1994 (2002), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rpr94.pdf. 
 19.  See H.R. REP. NO. 110-140, at 2 (2007), reprinted in 2008 U.S.C.C.A.N. 24, 25, 
20070WL 1378789 (“‘[P]rison after imprisonment’—a web of obstacles that limit their housing 
options, employment prospects, access to healthcare, and potential for family reunification.  These 
obstacles have substantially contributed to the historically high rate of recidivism . . . .”). 
 20.  See FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL POLICY 
AND SOCIAL PURPOSE 10 (1981) (“[T]he rehabilitative ideal has declined in the United States; the 
decline has been substantial, and it has been precipitous.”); Michael Pinard, Reflections and Per-
spectives on Reentry and Collateral Consequences, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1213, 1217 
(2010) (describing the “Rehabilitation Era” in the United States and the move towards “tough on 
crime”). 
 21.  See DOUGLAS HUSAK, OVERCRIMINALIZATION: THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 3–
54 (2008) (discussing the expansion of criminal law and the extraordinary rise in the use of pun-
ishment). 
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policing and mass rates of incarceration.22  As a result, in the last four dec-
ades, a growing proportion of the population has been convicted of a state 
or federal criminal offense.23  As of 2014, there were over a million and a 
half prisoners in both federal and state prisons.24  According to one report, 
one-third of the adult population in the United States has a criminal rec-
ord,25 the highest rate in the world.  The prisons in the “land of the free” 
eventually became overcrowded, placing financial burdens on the federal 
government and on states.26 
Toward the end of the twentieth century, the United States began a 
transition from a “tough on crime” to a “smart on crime” approach.27  One 
                                                          
 22.  Id. at 4–5. 
 23.  See Criminal Justice Facts, SENTENCING PROJECT (last visited Dec. 21, 2017), 
http://www.sentencingproject.org/criminal-justice-facts (arguing that the United States is the 
world leader in incarceration rates, and noting a 500% increase in incarceration rates since the 
mid-1970s).  For statistics on prisoners in state and federal correctional facilities, see E. ANN 
CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2014 (2015), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p14.pdf; PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 31: THE LONG 
REACH OF AMERICAN CORRECTIONS (2009), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/assets/2009/03/02/pspp_1in31_report_final_web_32609.pdf; 
PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA IN 2008 (2008), 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/reports/sentencing_and
_corrections/onein100pdf.pdf.  For further information, see Michael Pinard, Collateral Conse-
quences of Criminal Convictions: Confronting Issues of Race and Dignity, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
457, 466, 470 (2010). 
 24.  See CARSON, supra note 23, at 1. 
 25.  See Joe Palazzolo, 5 Things to Know About Background Checks and Expunged Records, 
WALL ST. J. (May 7, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/briefly/2015/05/07/background.  However, it is 
highly difficult to estimate the exact number of adults with criminal history because statistics de-
pend on various estimations, and “a complete dataset of arrests and prosecutions” does not cur-
rently exist.  Jo Craven McGinty, How Many Americans Have a Police Record? Probably More 
Than You Think, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 7, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-many-americans-
have-a-police-record-probably-more-than-you-think-1438939802. 
 26.  See Criminal Justice Facts, supra note 23. 
 27.  One of these “smart on crime” approaches was adopted by the Department of Justice, 
striving to move towards “an approach that is not only more efficient, and not only more effective 
at deterring crime and reducing recidivism, but also more consistent with our nation’s commit-
ment to treating all Americans as equal under the law.”  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SMART ON 
CRIME: REFORMING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (2013), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2013/08/12/smart-on-crime.pdf. 
There is also some congressional movement towards new penal models.  One example is the 
Second Chance Act of 2007, where Congress sought to improve existing programs and establish 
new ones to improve offender reentry services.  Second Chance Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-199, 
122 Stat. 657 (2008).  These programs, mainly,  
“(1) provid[ed] offenders in prisons, jails, or juvenile facilities with educational, litera-
cy, vocational, and job placement services to facilitate re-entry in the community; “(2) 
provid[ed] substance abuse treatment and services . . .; “(3) provid[ed] coordinated su-
pervision and comprehensive services for offenders upon release . . ., including housing 
and mental and physical health care to facilitate re-entry . . .; “(4) provid[ed] programs 
that—“(A) encourag[ed] offenders to develop safe, healthy, and responsible family re-
lationships and parent-child relationships . . .; “(5) encourag[ed] . . . facility mentors in 
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example of this new approach was the formation of reentry courts, designed 
to handle individuals rejoining the community after release from prison.28  
The “smart on crime” approach mainly traces back to the concept of reha-
bilitation and the acknowledgment of the need to reduce the potential col-
lateral consequences of criminal history. 
II.  REDUCING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES BY EXPUNGEMENT 
Rehabilitation necessitates enabling an individual to “rejoin that great 
bulk of the community from which he has been ostracized for his anti-social 
acts.”29  But merely rejoining society does not mean reintegrating into it.30  
The main barriers to reintegration are the potential collateral consequences 
of a criminal history.  Sometimes referred to as “invisible punishment[s],”31 
collateral consequences generally refer to any additional penalties outside 
the criminal law realm that individuals with criminal history, and perhaps 
even their families, incur.32  To name a few, individuals with a criminal his-
                                                          
the reentry process and enabl[ed] those mentors to remain in contact with offenders 
while in custody and after re-entry into the community; “(6) provid[ed] victim-
appropriate services,encourag[ed] the timely . . . payment of restitution . . ., and 
provid[ed] services such as security and counseling to victims upon release of offend-
ers; and “(7) protect[ed] communities against dangerous offenders by using validated 
assessment tools to assess the risk factors of returning inmates and develop[ed] or 
adopt[ed] procedures to ensure that dangerous felons are not released from prison 
prematurely.   
Id. § 101, 122 Stat. at 661; Pinard, supra note 20, at 1219.  
 28.  Pinard, supra note 20, at 1219. 
 29.  Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 41 (Cal. 1971). 
 30.  See JEREMY TRAVIS ET AL., URBAN INST. JUSTICE POLICY CTR., FROM PRISON TO 
HOME: THE DIMENSIONS AND CONSEQUENCES OF PRISONER REENTRY 1 (2001), 
http://research.urban.org/UploadedPDF/from_prison_to_home.pdf (differentiating between 
reentry and reintegration). 
 31.  Margaret Colgate Love, Starting over with a Clean Slate: In Praise of a Forgotten Sec-
tion of the Model Penal Code, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1705, 1705 n.2 (2003).  Collateral conse-
quences of criminal history have even been referred to as civil disabilities, among other terms.  
Jeremy Travis, Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion, in INVISIBLE 
PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT 15, 16 (Marc Mauer 
& Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2002).  For more on collateral consequences of convictions see, for 
example, Nora V. Demleitner, Preventing Internal Exile: The Need for Restrictions on Collateral 
Sentencing Consequences, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 153 (1999); Michael Pinard, An Integrated 
Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by 
Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623 (2006); Pinard, supra note 20; Pinard, 
supra note 23. 
 32.  This Article considers collateral consequences as penalties, disabilities, or disadvantages 
that occur due to criminal history, and not due to the sentence itself.  See Gabriel J. Chin, Race, 
the War on Drugs, and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Conviction, 6 J. GENDER RACE 
& JUST. 253, 255 (2002) (defining collateral sanctions); Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, 
Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 
697, 699–701 (2002); Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age, 
 2018] DIGITAL EXPUNGEMENT 343 
 
tory could be prevented from holding a professional license33; lose their vot-
ing rights (disenfranchisement)34; be denied healthcare benefits35; be de-
ported (if they do not hold permanent resident status)36; face travel re-
strictions37; be denied the right to serve on a jury38; lose access to higher 
education39; be deprived of both private and public housing40; be denied 
employment41; and generally carry a social stigma for the rest of their 
                                                          
2015 WIS. L. REV. 321, 336–37; see also SOLOVE, supra note 12, at 70 (arguing that “[s]tigma 
can spread to family members, as when a child feels stigmatized by a parent’s criminal past”). 
 33.  See JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER 
REENTRY 113–14 (2003). 
 34.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-22-36.1(g) (2015).  See generally CHRISTOPHER UGGEN ET 
AL., THE SENTENCING PROJECT, STATE-LEVEL ESTIMATES OF FELON DISENFRANCHISEMENT IN 
THE UNITED STATES, 2010 (2012), http://www.sentencingproject.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/State-Level-Estimates-of-Felon-Disenfranchisement-in-the-United-
States-2010.pdf.  
 35.  See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7(a) (2012) (excluding certain individuals and entities from 
participation in Medicare and state health care programs). 
 36.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (2012) (declaring aliens convicted of aggravated 
felonies as deportable). 
 37.  See, e.g., 23 U.S.C. § 159(a)(3)(A) (2012) (suspending drivers’ licenses of individuals 
convicted of drug offenses).  
 38.  See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1865(b)(5) (2012); see also Brian C. Kalt, The Exclusion of Felons 
from Jury Service, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 65, 186–89 (2003). 
 39.  See, e.g., Riya Shah, “Future Interrupted”: The Collateral Damage of Juvenile Adjudi-
cations, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (Mar. 4, 2016), 
http://ccresourcecenter.org/2016/03/04/future-interrupted-the-collateral-damage-of-juvenile-
adjudications/#more-8074 (“At least two-thirds of post-secondary institutions conduct background 
checks of prospective students.”).  
 40.  See PETERSILIA, supra note 33, at 121 (“[S]ome laws now require public housing agen-
cies and providers to deny housing to certain felons (e.g., drug and sex offenders).” (emphasis 
omitted)); Heidi Lee Cain, Comment, Housing Our Criminals: Finding Housing for the Ex-
Offender in the Twenty-First Century, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 131, 149–50 (2003) (discuss-
ing private landlord behavior); Rebecca Oyama, Note, Do Not (Re)Enter: The Rise of Criminal 
Background Tenant Screening as a Violation of the Fair Housing Act, 15 MICH. J. RACE & L. 
181, 187–92 (2009) (describing the practice of tenant screening). 
 41.  A felony conviction or time in prison can make individuals significantly less employable.  
While companies expose themselves to potential discrimination lawsuits, most employers in the 
United States request criminal history information for job candidates.  See HELEN GAEBLER, 
CRIMINAL RECORDS IN THE DIGITAL AGE: A REVIEW OF CURRENT PRACTICES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM IN TEXAS 12 (2013), https://law.utexas.edu/wp-
content/uploads/sites/27/Criminal-Records-in-the-Digital-Age-Report-by-Helen-Gaebler.pdf; 
DEVAH PAGER & BRUCE WESTERN, INVESTIGATING PRISONER REENTRY: THE IMPACT OF 
CONVICTION STATUS ON THE EMPLOYMENT PROSPECTS OF YOUNG MEN 4–5 (2009), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228584.pdf (finding that “a criminal record has a signif-
icant negative impact on hiring outcomes, even for applicants with otherwise appealing character-
istics”); JOHN SCHMITT & KRIS WARNER, CTR. FOR ECON. & POLICY RESEARCH, EX‐OFFENDERS 
AND THE LABOR MARKET 2 (2010), http://cepr.net/documents/publications/ex-offenders-2010-
11.pdf.  For more on the causation between incarceration and employment possibilities after re-
lease, see Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937 (2003). 
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lives.42  Many of these collateral consequences could also apply to juvenile 
adjudication, and much like criminal records for adults, criminal records for 
juveniles could impose barriers to education and employment.43 
Collateral consequences can be far reaching and may affect individuals 
with a criminal history, their families, and society.  Collateral consequences 
may be generally divided into two sub-groups.  The first sub-group is col-
lateral consequences imposed by the state.  These governmental collateral 
consequences include any restrictions on state-based services and rights 
such as holding a professional license, living and working in the country, 
voting, receiving state healthcare benefits, traveling, living in federal hous-
ing, and serving on a jury.  The second sub-group consists of collateral con-
sequences imposed by members of society.44  These social collateral conse-
quences are those imposed by private entities and include denial of 
admission to educational institutions, denial of housing, denial of employ-
ment, and the imposition of a social stigma. 
The scope of collateral consequences resulting from a criminal history 
are always difficult to assess45 and are not always accounted for by the legal 
system and by defendants.46  Both types of collateral consequences might 
                                                          
 42.  For example, convicts could also be barred from carrying a firearm if “convicted in any 
court, of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year[,]” 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)(1) (2012); be ineligible from receiving federal welfare benefits, Chin, supra note 32, at 
259–62; and cannot enlist in the military, 10 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2012).  For more on the stigma of 
criminal history records, see James B. Jacobs, Mass Incarceration and the Proliferation of Crimi-
nal Records, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 387, 390, 419–20 (2006) and Amy Shlosberg et al., Expunge-
ment and Post-Exoneration Offending, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 353, 380–84 (2014). 
 43.  When a child is arrested, a juvenile record is created, and the record remains even if the 
case is closed.  See Future Interrupted: The Collateral Damage Caused by Proliferation of Juve-
nile Records, JUV. LAW CTR., http://www.jlc.org/future-interrupted (last visited Dec. 21, 2017).  
The impact of collateral consequences on juvenile offenders was recognized by policymakers in 
the past, and various suggestions and programs were formed to aid in juvenile offenders’ reinte-
gration into society.  See, for example, the American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) formation of the 
“Juvenile Collateral Consequences Project.”  See T. Markus Funk & Daniel D. Polsby, Distribu-
tional Consequences of Expunging Juvenile Delinquency Records: The Problem of Lemons, 52 
WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 161, 162–65 (1997); Pinard, supra note 20, at 1221. 
 44.  As further noted, there are various parties that could be interested in criminal history rec-
ords.  For example, both public and private employers sometimes seek access to criminal histories 
to screen potential candidates, for licensing, or before placing individuals in positions of trust.  
Non-profit organizations place employees and volunteers to work with vulnerable populations; 
landlords and educational facilities could refer to criminal history records when making their deci-
sions; and people might just be curious about who lives in their neighborhood.  See OFFICE OF THE 
ATTORNEY GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT ON CRIMINAL 
HISTORY BACKGROUND CHECKS 1 (2006), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ag_bgchecks_report.pdf [hereinafter ATTORNEY GENERAL’S 
REPORT]. 
 45.  Chin, supra note 32, at 254. 
 46.  See Robert H. Gorman, Collateral Sanctions in Practice in Ohio, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 469, 
469 (2005) (arguing that many defendants are unaware of collateral sanctions); Pinard, supra note 
31, at 669. 
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lead to a civil death,47 as they deprive individuals with a criminal history of 
the necessary tools for reintegrating into society.48  They potentially in-
crease chances of recidivism,49 enhance unlawful discrimination,50 and can 
negatively impact the labor market to the extent that employers refuse to 
hire the most skilled and experienced employees.51  In recent years, the im-
pact of collateral consequences in the United States is increasing due to the 
growing number of individuals with a criminal history.52 
Rehabilitation necessitates the elimination, or at least the substantial 
reduction, of collateral consequences.  If modern society acknowledges the 
need to allow the reintegration of reformed individuals into society, poli-
cymakers must provide them equal civil opportunities and reduce collateral 
consequences.53  There are many methods that could be deployed to aid the 
reintegration of individuals into society—for instance, creating centers that 
aid in coordinating various services,54 providing legal assistance, and estab-
lishing community-based advocacy groups that provide reentry-related ser-
vices.55 
                                                          
 47.  Civil death often “refers to the condition in which a convicted offender loses all political, 
civil, and legal rights,” and was imported to the United States from England during the colonial 
period.  Alec C. Ewald, “Civil Death”: The Ideological Paradox of Criminal Disenfranchisement 
Law in the United States, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1045, 1049 n.13, 1061.  See generally Gabriel J. 
Chin, The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Conviction, 160 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1789 (2012). 
 48.  See, e.g., Love, supra note 31, at 1705. 
 49.  See Aidan R. Gough, The Expungement of Adjudication Records of Juvenile and Adult 
Offenders: A Problem of Status, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q. 147, 148 (arguing that the more heavily an 
ex-offender bears the mark of his former offense, the more likely he is to reoffend); Christopher 
Uggen, Work as a Turning Point in the Life Course of Criminals: A Duration Model of Age, Em-
ployment, and Recidivism, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 529, 542–44 (2000) (arguing that having stable 
work reduces recidivism). 
 50.  For an extensive discussion of racial discrimination in the United States, see generally 
KATHERYN K. RUSSELL, THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK 
PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT, AND OTHER MACROAGGRESSIONS (1998). 
 51.  See GAEBLER, supra note 41, at 4. 
 52.  See PETERSILIA, supra note 33, at 136; Pinard, supra note 20, at 1214–15. 
 53.  The Supreme Court acknowledged the importance of reducing collateral consequences 
back in 1984.  See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697 (1984) (encouraging considera-
tion of collateral consequences regarding ineffective assistance of counsel in a criminal proceed-
ing).  It is notable that several appellate courts opined that collateral consequences are detached 
from the criminal process.  See Pinard, supra note 31, at 671.  For more on collateral consequenc-
es, see supra note 31. 
 54.  See Pinard, supra note 31, at 626; AMY L. SOLOMON ET AL., URB. INST., OUTSIDE THE 
WALLS: A NATIONAL SNAPSHOT OF COMMUNITY-BASED PRISONER REENTRY PROGRAMS 
(2004), http://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/410911-Outside-the-
Walls.PDF. 
 55.  Pinard, supra note 31, at 626, 664.  Congress also sought to aid in such reintegration by 
proposing various bills relating to reentry.  See, e.g., Second Chance Act of 2005: Community 
Safety Through Recidivism Prevention, S. 1934, 109th Cong. (2005); Second Chance Act of 
2005: Community Safety Through Recidivism Prevention, H.R. 1704, 109th Cong. (2005). 
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Perhaps the most crucial measure for ensuring rehabilitation came 
when policymakers acknowledged the importance of restoring most civic 
rights by crafting expungement statutes.56  Expungement is the process by 
which a criminal history could later be vacated, reversed, sealed, purged, or 
destroyed by the state.57  The rationale behind expungement is that if an in-
dividual is reformed, and thus capable of reintegrating into society—and, 
notably, reintegration is not necessarily possible in many instances58—then 
it is socially preferable to enable, encourage, and facilitate such reintegra-
tion.59  Expungement statutes generally have four goals: (1) reducing recid-
ivism and thereby enhancing public safety; (2) enabling rehabilitation; (3) 
reducing illegal discrimination against presumptively rehabilitated individ-
uals; and (4) rewarding those who prove they have been rehabilitated.60  
While the use of expungement statutes for rehabilitation was widely criti-
cized both on moral and practical grounds,61 even critics agree that such 
statutes must be carefully tailored to create a balance between the goal of 
helping rehabilitate offenders and aiding in ensuring public safety.62 
Expungement statutes in the United States were rather limited at first.63  
But by the late 1970s, most states provided procedures for restoration of 
                                                          
 56.  Love, supra note 31, at 1714. 
 57.  It should be noted the term expungement usually means that the record has been erased as 
though the event never occurred, while other terms like sealed, mean that a record or proceeding 
is simply sealed, rather than destroyed.  This Article uses the term expungement to describe an act 
in which criminal history records can be vacated, reversed, sealed, purged, or destroyed by the 
state.  For more on this distinction, see Carlton J. Snow, Expungement and Employment Law: The 
Conflict Between an Employer’s Need to Know About Juvenile Misdeeds and an Employee’s Need 
to Keep Them Secret, 41 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3, 22–24 (1992).  See also Nafziger & 
Yimesgen, supra note 4, at 916; Andrew Hacker, Comment, The Use of Expunged Records to Im-
peach Credibility in Arizona, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 467, 468 (2010). 
 58.  Jon Geffen & Stefanie Letze, Chained to the Past: An Overview of Criminal Expunge-
ment Law in Minnesota—State v. Schultz, 31 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1331, 1335 (2005); Logan 
Danielle Wayne, Comment, The Data-Broker Threat: Proposing Federal Legislation to Protect 
Post-Expungement Privacy, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 253, 258 (2012) (arguing “ex-
pungement is granted only to those who deserve it most.”). 
 59.  See, e.g., Geffen & Letze, supra note 58, at 1340 (“Expungement relieves society of the 
burden of supporting certain individuals with criminal records.  As previously explained, an ex-
pungement can allow an individual to obtain employment and eliminate the individual’s reliance 
on government benefits.”).  However, expungement is not always beneficial for society.  Some 
felons, even after a completion of their sentence, should still be criminally labeled because socie-
ty—or at least vulnerable segments of it, like juveniles—might be in need of protection from 
them.  Therefore, even if expungement exists, it would usually be limited to certain types of of-
fenses and offenders. 
 60.  See Marc A. Franklin & Diane Johnsen, Expunging Criminal Records: Concealment and 
Dishonesty in an Open Society, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 733, 744 (1981). 
 61.  For a summary of such criticism, see Michael D. Mayfield, Revisiting Expungement: 
Concealing Information in the Information Age, 1997 UTAH L. REV. 1057, 1066–72. 
 62.  Id. at 1061–62. 
 63.  Expungement statutes could be traced back in the United States to the 1940s.  Back then, 
these statutes were rather limited and related mostly to rehabilitation possibilities for youthful of-
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civil rights for individuals with a criminal history.64  As part of a transition 
to a so-called “smart on crime” approach,65 many states in recent years cre-
ated or expanded expungement statutes mainly for individuals whose arrest 
did not lead to conviction, and also for those convicted of certain crimes.66  
While many have criticized expungement statutes,67 most jurisdictions cur-
rently have some form of expungement statute,68 and their use seems to be 
growing.69 
                                                          
fenders.  See Love, supra note 31, at 1709; Fred C. Zacharias, The Uses and Abuses of Convic-
tions Set Aside Under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 1981 DUKE L.J. 477, 480 n.15, 482–83. 
 64.  Currently, expungement is very limited on the federal level.  The only federal expunge-
ment provision relates to offenses under Section 404 of the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 
§ 844 (2012), when the person was less than twenty-one years old at the time of the offense.  See 
18 U.S.C. § 3607(c) (2012).  For an example of a federal court expungement order, see Doe v. 
United States, 110 F. Supp. 3d 448, 458 (E.D.N.Y. 2015), vacated, 833 F.3d 192 (2d Cir. 2016); 
Doe v. United States, 2015 WL 2452613 (E.D.N.Y. May 21, 2015), 129 HARV. L. REV. 582 
(2015).  However, there have been several proposed bills regarding expungement at the federal 
level.  For example, the Second Chance for Ex-Offenders Act aimed to “[a]mend[] the federal 
criminal code to allow an individual to file a petition for expungement of a record of conviction 
for a nonviolent criminal offense.”  Summary, Second Chance for Ex-Offenders Act of 2009, H.R. 
1529, 111th Cong. (1st Sess. 2009), https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/house-
bill/1529; see also Second Chance for Ex-Offenders Act of 2009, H.R. 1529, 111th Cong. (1st 
Sess. 2009); Second Chance for Ex-Offenders Act of 2011, H.R. 2065, 112th Cong. (2011); Love, 
supra note 31, at 1709 n.16.  The Fresh Start Act of 2011 proposed to allow expungement for sev-
eral non-violent offenders.  H.R. 2449, 112th Cong. (2011).  The Record Expungement Designed 
to Enhance Employment (REDEEM) Act of 2015 was aimed to allow for the expungement of fed-
eral criminal records for one time, non-violent offenses.  S. 675, 114th Cong. (2015).  For more on 
the need for federal expungement legislation, see Fruqan Mouzon, Forgive Us Our Trespasses: 
The Need for Federal Expungement Legislation, 39 U. MEM. L. REV. 1 (2008); Wayne, supra note 
58. 
 65.  Jenny Roberts attributes the new movement for strengthening and expanding expunge-
ment laws to: “(1) mass criminalization, (2) mass collateral consequences of criminal records, (3) 
technological advances that make criminal records easily accessible, and (4) a national obsession 
with viewing all aspects of people’s pasts.”  Roberts, supra note 32, at 325.  
 66.  RESTORATION OF RIGHTS PROJECT, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR., JUDICIAL 
EXPUNGEMENT, SEALING, AND SET-ASIDE (2017), http://ccresourcecenter.org/resources-
2/restoration-of-rights/50-state-comparisonjudicial-expungement-sealing-and-set-aside (last up-
dated Nov. 2017). 
 67.  Beyond criticism of their effectiveness, expungement statutes “constrain[] the public’s 
ability to speak or publish information about the judiciary.”  Meliah Thomas, Comment, The First 
Amendment Right of Access to Docket Sheets, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1537, 1566 (2006); see also Mat-
thew D. Callanan, Note, Protecting the Unconvicted: Limiting Iowa’s Rights to Public Access in 
Search of Greater Protection for Criminal Defendants Whose Charges Do Not End in Convic-
tions, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1275, 1304 (2013) (summarizing arguments against undermining public 
access to the judiciary); John P. Sellers, III, Sealed with an Acquittal: When Not Guilty Means 
Never Having to Say You Were Tried, 32 CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 12–18 (2003) (questioning the exist-
ence of a right to privacy in a public trial). 
 68.  See RESTORATION OF RIGHTS PROJECT, supra note 66. 
 69.  For example, in 2016, the State of Kentucky expanded the scope of expungement beyond 
misdemeanor offenders, granting individuals convicted of certain non-violent felonies, or who had 
received a full pardon, the opportunity to petition to have their convictions vacated, charges dis-
missed, and records expunged.  Joshua Gaines, Expungement Expansion Round-Up (2016 Edi-
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As previously mentioned, expungement statutes vary, in both termi-
nology and scope,70 from one U.S. state to another.71  In some states, ex-
pungement refers to the sealing of a record, while in others it means that the 
conviction is legally treated as though it never occurred.72  Some industries 
have been regulated beyond expungement legislation.  For example, in 
some instances, employment discrimination against persons with criminal 
records was prohibited in the United States in the mid-1960s.73  A few 
states have gone a step further, and made it illegal for all employers to turn 
away job applicants with a criminal history.74 
But perhaps the biggest threat to expungement in recent years arises 
from an aspect that could not have been accounted for when expungement 
legislation first emerged.  Initially, rehabilitation by expungement worked 
well in the kinetic world.  The process of expungement made criminal his-
                                                          
tion), COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR.  (May 23, 2016), 
http://ccresourcecenter.org/2016/05/23/expungement-expansion-round-up-2016-edition/#more-
9973.  The State of New Jersey approved P.L. 2015, c. 261, effective in April 2016.  Id.  This leg-
islation made expungement of non-conviction records automatic and immediate.  Id.  It “author-
iz[ed] immediate expungement following successful completion of drug court or court-ordered 
rehabilitation, . . . allow[ed] for early expungement of youthful drug offenses, reduc[ed] the wait-
ing period for expungement,  . . . and allow[ed] felonies and misdemeanors to be expunged at the 
same time.”  Id.  Another example is that of Maryland, which passed the Justice Reinvestment 
Act, authorizing courts to expunge misdemeanor offenses “after ten crime-free years.”  Id.; see 
also RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. FOR JUSTICE, RELIEF IN SIGHT? STATES RETHINK 
THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTION, 2009–2014, at 11 (2014), 
http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/states-rethink-collateral-
consequences-report-v4.pdf (“41 states and the District of Columbia enacted 155 pieces of legisla-
tion between 2009 and 2014 to mitigate the burden of collateral consequences for individuals with 
certain criminal convictions.”).  For updated information on expungement legislation in the United 
States, see Gaines, supra. 
 70.  See Snow, supra note 57, at 21. 
 71.  For a full list of expungement statutes in the United States, see RESTORATION OF RIGHTS 
PROJECT, supra note 66.  See also Shlosberg et al., supra note 42, at 355–62 (conducting a survey 
on the varieties of expungement laws). 
 72.  Clay Calvert & Jerry Bruno, When Cleansing Criminal History Clashes with the First 
Amendment and Online Journalism: Are Expungement Statutes Irrelevant in the Digital Age?, 19 
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS J. COMM. L. & POL’Y 123, 131–32 (2010); Snow, supra note 57, at 46–
73. 
 73.  Employment discrimination could violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964.  42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2(a) (2012) (prohibiting employment discrimination based on individual’s race, color, 
religion, sex, or national origin).  Denying employment to individuals based on an arrest or con-
viction record could, to a great extent, lead to discriminating against groups in society that are 
more likely to be arrested or convicted than others, for example, African Americans and Latinos.  
See U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, SERIAL # 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE 
ON THE CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS 
UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, at 9–10 (2012), 
https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/upload/arrest_conviction.pdf; Kimani Paul-Emile, Beyond 
Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-offender Status and Employment Discrimination in the Information 
Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 920–24 (2014).  
 74.  See Walter Olson, How Employers Are Forced to Hire Murderers and Other Felons, 
WALL ST. J. (June 18, 1997), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB866589021936288500. 
 2018] DIGITAL EXPUNGEMENT 349 
 
tory records invisible to the public,75 as the records were only visible to 
public officials under limited circumstances.  These records were no longer 
conceived of as public records.  While it was not illegal for the private sec-
tor to disseminate the criminal histories of individuals even after expunge-
ment, it was practically impossible: Those records were obtained from gov-
ernmental entities that no longer maintained them.  To obtain all criminal 
history records, including those that were expunged, would have required 
private parties to assemble a database of all criminal records prior to ex-
pungement—something that was impractical.  Even if the media published 
anything related to an individual’s criminal history prior to expungement, 
and the publication was accessible through their archives, it was not easy 
for individuals to gather this information.76  Thus, in a purely kinetic world, 
it was sufficient for policymakers to confine the process of expungement to 
obscuring previously public records and making them available only to 
public officials.  The digital era changed this form of practical obscurity. 
III.  REHABILITATION IN THE DIGITAL AGE 
Digital technology could play an important role in criminal law.  It 
could enhance enforcement capabilities and improve intelligence.  For one 
thing, digital technology makes information storage and sharing easier, 
cheaper, and broader in scope.77  It has, for example, enabled the first-ever 
national criminal record information sharing program in the United States.78  
Technological advances also led to the integration of a nationwide criminal 
justice information system and the creation of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation’s (“FBI”) Interstate Identification Index (“III”) in the 1970s.79  In 
1998, Congress established and funded a program that incentivizes states to 
                                                          
 75.  Pre-digital technologies, even without expungement, made criminal records functionally 
invisible.  See Elizabeth D. De Armond, Frothy Chaos: Modern Data Warehousing and Old-
Fashioned Defamation, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1061, 1068 (2007).  
 76.  Media coverage could take various forms, for example, TVs, radios and newspapers. 
There is even a practice of tabloids/pamphlets that print mugshots alongside names and charges. 
See Stephanie Fox, “Busted Paper” and Other Mugshot Magazines: Why They Are—and Will 
Likely Remain—Legal, DAILY PLANET (Apr. 7, 2013), https://www.tcdailyplanet.net/busted-
paper-and-other-mugshot-magazines-why-they-are-and-will-likely-remain-legal.  
 77.  For a general review of the technological changes to justice information systems, see 
Gregory M. Silverman, Rise of the Machines: Justice Information Systems and the Question of 
Public Access to Court Records over the Internet, 79 WASH. L. REV. 175 (2004). 
 78.  See PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENF’T & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF 
CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 266–69, 279 (1967) (describing the need for a national directory); 
James B. Jacobs & Dimitra Blitsa, Sharing Criminal Records: The United States, the European 
Union and Interpol Compared, 30 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 125, 130 (2008) (noting de-
velopment of state and federal database integration). 
 79.  BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
TASK FORCE ON COURT AUTOMATION AND INTEGRATION 2–3 (1999); Jacobs & Blitsa, supra 
note 78, at 130–32. 
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improve the quality, timeliness, and immediate accessibility of criminal his-
tory records and related information with the formation of the Criminal His-
tory Records Improvement Program (“CHRI”)—succeeded by the National 
Criminal History Improvement Program (“NCHIP”).80  Many states have 
centralized court records and made them accessible to anyone who seeks 
such information.81  Likewise, Congress mandated electronic accessibility 
of records held by federal agencies and federal courts, either by remote ac-
cess or by onsite computer terminals.82 
Naturally, digital technology could aid in promoting the rehabilitative 
rationales behind expungement, as it could potentially increase the accuracy 
of criminal histories.  In turn, it would make only non-expunged records 
publicly available, lower the costs and bureaucracy of updating information 
on expunged records, and generally make updated criminal histories much 
more accessible and affordable.83 
In an age of mass-incarceration and over-criminalization, rehabilitation 
becomes even more important.  Currently, nearly one out of every three 
American adults has a criminal record.84  Somewhere between 10,000 and 
12,000 new names are added each day to the FBI’s master criminal data-
base.85  With such a dramatic increase in the amount of individuals who exit 
society, policymakers must also ensure the reintegration of those who rejoin 
society to reduce recidivism. 
As previously noted, expungement statutes are limited in application to 
the public sector.  With some exceptions,86 criminal history records that 
                                                          
 80.  Jacobs & Blitsa, supra note 78, at 133–34; James Jacobs & Tamara Crepet, The Expand-
ing Scope, Use, and Availability of Criminal Records, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 177, 
180–81 (2008); National Criminal History Improvement Program, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., 
http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=47 (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). 
 81.  See Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 80, at 183–85. 
 82.  See E-Government Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-347, § 205, 116 Stat. 2899, 2913–14 
(2002); Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 80, at 185. 
 83.  Davis, supra note 5, at 874; Jacobs, supra note 42, at 388 (“Information technology has 
increased the capacity and reduced the cost of collecting, storing, and searching criminal rec-
ords.”).  For a general review of the impact of data accessibility on public records, see De Ar-
mond, supra note 75, at 1068–71. 
 84.  See Gary Fields & John R. Emshwiller, As Arrest Records Rise, Americans Find Conse-
quences Can Last a Lifetime, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 18, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/as-
arrest-records-rise-americans-find-consequences-can-last-a-lifetime-1408415402 (“[T]he FBI cur-
rently has 77.7 million individuals on file in its master criminal database—or nearly one out of 
every three American adults.”). 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  In Minnesota, for example, courts have limited the expungement remedy under the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine and ruled that district courts’ authority to seal records does not apply to 
executive branch records, which in turn would remain available to the public.  See State v. 
Schultz, 676 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004).  For an analysis of Minnesota’s expunge-
ment treatment, see Geffen & Letze, supra note 58 and Robert C. Whipps, Note, Retaining the 
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were expunged are visible only to public officials under specific circum-
stances.  Prior to the digital era, policymakers were not generally concerned 
about the private use of expunged criminal histories, as it was unlikely that 
individuals would be able to obtain and retain such information.  Interested 
parties were able to receive updated information only from the public sec-
tor, which, in its optimal mode, did not contain expunged records.87  Thus, 
the regulation of “real space” had the effect of confining (or zoning) the 
collateral consequences of expunged records.88 
But digital data practices have proven to be a game changer in the 
realm of criminal history records.89  Instead of aiding in rehabilitating indi-
viduals with criminal history records, digital data practices make expunge-
ment statutes almost inapplicable, and even potentially facilitate a market 
for expunged criminal histories.  These practices effectively increase the 
social collateral consequences for individuals with a criminal history, as 
non-updated information is made highly accessible through existing private 
background check companies (data brokers) and by the internet. 
A.  Expungement via Data Brokers 
Criminal history records exist in various governmental databases, both 
state and federal.  They could exist independently at government agencies, 
courts, enforcement agencies, and corrections departments,90 and they are 
generally considered public information.91  The wide availability of crimi-
nal history records through governmental agencies created a demand for a 
more efficient method of searching the various agencies’ records even prior 
to the digital age.  Employers, landlords, and educational institutions were 
in need of a service that would enable them to check the criminal history of 
potential employment candidates, renters, or students.  Presumably, crimi-
                                                          
Scarlet Letter: The Tension Between Branch Powers, Law, and Equity with Inherent Authority 
Expungement–State v. M.D.T., 7 WM. MITCHELL J.L. & PRAC. 1 (2014). 
 87.  See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, A Liberal Communitarian Conception of Privacy, 29 J. 
MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 419, 432 (2012). 
 88.  Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 501, 501–02 (1999).  Lawrence Lessig identified “zoning speech” as one problem raised by 
the distinction between real space and cyberspace.  See id. at 510.  
 89.  See Anna Kessler, Comment, Excavating Expungement Law: A Comprehensive Ap-
proach, 87 TEMP. L. REV. 403, 411 (2015) (“The modern era of rapidly expanding technology has 
thwarted attempts of reentry and rehabilitation.”). 
 90.  Palazzolo, supra note 25. 
 91.  The reasons behind making criminal records public information could be diverse.  Be-
yond freedom of information, the justification from a criminal law perspective could rely on 
grounds of deterrence, protecting the general public, and retribution, among other reasons.  For 
some of this reasoning, see Jacobs, supra note 42, at 396. 
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nal background checks for some purposes could provide vital red flags:92 
They could lower liability for negligent hiring or retention;93 reduce risk of 
theft, fraud, and workplace violence;94 and could be generally perceived as 
important for public safety measures, protecting employees, customers, 
vulnerable persons, and business assets.95  More generally, there was a great 
demand for companies that could provide a service for end-users to obtain 
criminal history records that could potentially be more accurate and nation-
wide in scope.96 
The demand for aggregated, nationwide criminal history records was 
met with the emergence of commercial vendors (data brokers) that sell such 
information.97  Under their initial business model, the threat to the efficacy 
of expungement statutes was not significant.  Upon receiving a request for a 
criminal history, the vendors would prepare a report by sending personnel 
(“runners”) to courts, police departments, and other governmental agen-
                                                          
 92.  See Steven Raphael, Should Criminal History Records Be Universally Available?, 5 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 515, 516–17 (2006) (listing reasons why some employers are in 
need of criminal background checks).  
 93.  Employers could be subject to liability under negligent hiring doctrines when the job ap-
plicant has a criminal history that is relevant to the responsibilities of a job, and the employer 
failed to determine that his or her placement in the position would create an unreasonable risk to 
other employees or the public.  See SEARCH, THE NAT’L CONSORTIUM FOR JUSTICE INFO. & 
STATISTICS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON THE COMMERCIAL SALE OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE RECORD INFORMATION 65–68 (2005), http://www.search.org/files/pdf/RNTFCSCJRI.pdf 
[hereinafter THE COMMERCIAL SALE REPORT]; Stephen F. Befort, Pre-Employment Screening 
and Investigation: Navigating Between a Rock and a Hard Place, 14 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 365, 366 
(1997); Robert L. Levin, Workplace Violence: Navigating Through the Minefield of Legal Liabil-
ity, 11 LAB. LAW. 171, 175 (1995); Kristen A. Williams, Comment, Employing Ex-Offenders: 
Shifting the Evaluation of Workplace Risks and Opportunities from Employers to Corrections, 55 
UCLA L. REV. 521, 523–24 (2007); Douglas Belkin, More Job Seekers Scramble to Erase Their 
Criminal Past, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2009), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125789494126242343.html; cf. GAEBLER, supra note 41, at 17 
(arguing that “[f]ear of negligent hiring liability is greatly exaggerated”).  For an example of neg-
ligent hiring (failure to conduct a criminal background check prior to hiring) and its legal conse-
quences, see Harrington v. La. State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 714 So. 2d 845 (La. 
Ct. App. 1998). 
 94.  SOC’Y FOR HUMAN RES. MGMT., Background Checking: Conducting Criminal Back-
ground Checks, SLIDESHARE (Jan. 22, 2010), http://www.slideshare.net/shrm/background-check-
criminal (providing statistics for the primary reasons that organizations conduct criminal back-
ground checks on job candidates); cf. Williams, supra note 93, at 534 (“[T]here appears to be no 
research suggesting that a high percentage of workplace violence is committed by employed ex-
offenders.”). 
 95.  See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 44, at 20.  But see GAEBLER, supra note 
41, at 16–17 (criticizing the “public safety” argument). 
 96.  See ATTORNEY GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 44, at 39 (listing benefits and drawbacks 
of data brokers). 
 97.  See generally JAMES B. JACOBS, THE ETERNAL CRIMINAL RECORD 70–73 (2015) (de-
scribing privatization of criminal records by commercial information vendors). 
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cies.98  As long as the database of the public office was updated, these re-
ports would exclude expunged criminal history records. 
To a great extent, digital technology changed the practices and busi-
ness models of data brokers.  There was no longer a need—and it was eco-
nomically inefficient—to send runners to, or file multiple requests with, 
governmental agencies across the country.  Data brokers moved towards 
digital data models, which reduced and even eliminated the need for run-
ners,99 and enabled them to build and maintain their own databases by pur-
chasing criminal records in bulk from governmental agencies and other data 
holders.100  Under this new business model, data brokers maintained da-
tasets, and upon a specific request for criminal history, they search their 
own database.101 It made the provision of a background report almost in-
stantaneous, more available, and perhaps more affordable for companies.102 
But instead of making relevant criminal history records (only those 
records that were not expunged) more accessible, this model eventually led 
to new risks caused by a flawed system.  The main risk arose from inaccu-
racy in databases of both governmental agencies,103 and perhaps mostly of 
data brokers, which were not frequently updated.104  These inaccuracies 
could lead to difficulties in interpreting reports,105 false positives, and false 
negatives,106 among others.107  In the context of this Article, inaccuracy es-
                                                          
 98.  See THE COMMERCIAL SALE REPORT, supra note 93, at 9. 
 99.  Id. at 10. 
 100.  Id. 
 101.  For more information on the practices of data brokers, see, for example, FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2014), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-
accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf. 
 102.  See Ryan D. Watstein, Note, Out of Jail and Out of Luck: The Effect of Negligent Hiring 
Liability and the Criminal Record Revolution on an Ex-Offender’s Employment Prospects, 61 
FLA. L. REV. 581, 592–93 (2009). 
 103.  Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 84 (“Only half of the records with the FBI have fully 
up-to-date information.”). 
 104.  JACOBS, supra note 97, at 133–39; Michael H. Jagunic, Note, The Unified “Sealed” The-
ory: Updating Ohio’s Record-Sealing Statute for the Twenty-First Century, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 
161, 171 (2011). 
 105.  Criminal history records could be sometimes confusing and difficult to interpret to non-
experts, especially with differences in states’ criminal codes.  See GAEBLER, supra note 41, at 14. 
 106.  In 1999, the Department of Justice found that a name-based check of 6,300,000 individu-
als without records produced 5.5% false positives, and a name-based check of 600,000 persons 
with records produced 11.7% false negatives.  See NAT’L TASK FORCE TO THE U.S. ATTORNEY 
GEN., NCJ-179358, INTERSTATE IDENTIFICATION INDEX NAME CHECK EFFICACY 48–49 (1999), 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps65765/III_Name_Check.pdf. 
 107.  There are many problems that arise from the practices of at least some background check 
companies.  For example, they do not use unique identifiers—such as Social Security numbers—
but rather only a first and last name, and consumers might be harmed even if they do not have a 
criminal record.  See 7 Shocking Quotes from the National Association of Professional Back-
ground Screeners Conference, THE EXPUNGED RECORD, 
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sentially means that using data brokers could often lead to a false—or rather 
non-updated—criminal history caused, inter alia, by not excluding ex-
punged records.  This risk would vitiate any efforts to reduce the social col-
lateral consequences resulting from a criminal record.108  While in many in-
stances inaccuracy could be caused by both the volume of updates109 and 
the architecture of large databases—which might make them difficult or 
costly to update frequently110—it might also be intentional, resulting from a 
rather unique market demand for incorrect data.  Under this argument, 
many users of criminal histories, like employers, landlords, and educational 
institutions, would prefer databases contain expunged records to be fully 
exposed to the complete criminal history of a prospect.111 
Regardless of the reasons behind these practices, their risk to rehabili-
tation is evident.  Policymakers have acknowledged some of the potential 
risks posed by the practices of data brokers and attempted to mitigate them 
through regulation, especially regarding the use of criminal history records 
for employment or housing purposes.  On the state level, policymakers at-
tempted to regulate the practices of data brokers by imposing various forms 
of legal restrictions on both data brokers and their consumers.112  On the 
federal level, Congress regulated background check reports produced by da-
ta brokers through the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”).113  The FCRA 
                                                          
http://www.theexpungedrecord.com/blog/7-shocking-quotes-from-the-annual-national-
association-of-professional-background-screeners-conference (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). It 
should be noted that even Social Security numbers might not be accurate as an identifier.  Other 
measures, biometric identifiers for example, should be considered. 
 108.  Some employers might not even mind the criminal record, but rather the fact that a can-
didate was untruthful.  That could occur when candidates have denied having a criminal record, as 
the record was sealed or expunged and therefore they are entitled to say that they do not have a 
criminal record, and are perceived as lying to the employer.  See Belkin, supra note 93 (quoting 
Cardinal Services’ manager and general counsel Mike Lehman saying, “If someone has a criminal 
history, we can work with them. . . .  But if they have one and lie to us, that’s pretty ominous.”); 
GAEBLER, supra note 41, at 14. 
 109.  See GAEBLER, supra note 41, at 13 (“[T]he aggregators themselves may not update in-
formation as frequently as needed given the fluid nature of criminal justice proceedings.”). 
 110.  While technology should presumably aid in reducing these costs and eliminating difficul-
ties to update, periodically purchasing datasets in bulk from various sources makes this practice 
more difficult. 
 111.  See THE COMMERCIAL SALE REPORT, supra note 93, at 83–84.  This argument, however, 
is rather intuitive and relies on this Author’s assumption that at least some users of criminal histo-
ry records might care less about aiding in rehabilitation and care more about their needs.  Accord-
ingly, this argument should be treated carefully without empirical studies to support it. 
 112.  See Paul-Emile, supra note 73, at 918 n.21 (“[E]very state has different laws relating to 
what information can be obtained and/or used by consumer reporting agencies and end-users with 
permissible purposes.”). 
 113.  15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012).  It should be noted that while the Privacy Act of 1974 estab-
lished a Code of Fair Information Practice that governs the collection and retention of data, it only 
applies to systems of records held by governmental agencies.  See Privacy Act of 1974, Pub. L. 
No. 93-579, 88 Stat. 1896 (1974). 
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requires all consumer reporting agencies—which, since 1998, includes 
agencies conducting criminal background checks114—to adopt “reasonable 
procedures to assure maximum possible accuracy”115 “in a manner which is 
fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accu-
racy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information.”116  Upon inves-
tigation of a consumer dispute, data that is “found to be inaccurate or in-
complete or cannot be verified” must be “promptly delete[d]” by the 
consumer reporting agency.117  Also, while reporting convictions has no 
time limit, consumer reporting agencies are generally prohibited from re-
porting arrest records that are more than seven years old (or beyond the 
governing statute of limitations) if they did not result in the entry of a 
judgment of conviction.118  In exchange, those companies receive immunity 
from defamation, invasion of privacy, or negligence claims.119 Finally, 
while the FCRA grants a private right of action to file suit under the consti-
tutional standing doctrine,120 litigants will be required to demonstrate that 
due to these companies’ practices they suffered an injury in fact—not an 
easy task even if the data will be proven as inaccurate.121 
Regarding the use of criminal history records by employers, the FCRA 
imposed a few obligations and restrictions.122  Data brokers must notify the 
consumer and “maintain strict procedures” to ensure that information they 
give employers reflects the most current public records if the information 
might adversely affect a job applicant.123  Employers are required to notify 
job applicants prior to obtaining a criminal history report, to obtain their 
consent, and to inform them if an adverse action was taken based on the re-
port.124 
                                                          
 114.  Criminal background checks were included under the FCRA under the Federal Trade 
Commission’s instructions.  See Fed. Trade Comm’n, Opinion Letter on Sections 603, 607, and 
609 of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (June 9, 1998), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/statutes/fcra/leblanc.shtm; Paul-Emile, supra note 73, at 916–17. 
 115.  15 U.S.C. § 1681e(b). 
 116.  Id. § 1681(b). 
 117.  Id. § 1681i(a)(5)(A).  118.  Id. § 1681c(a)(2), (5).  
 119.  Liability for invasion of privacy, defamation, and negligence claims for reporting false 
information about applicants is limited to instances where it is furnished with malice or willful 
intent to injure the consumer.  See id. § 1681h(e). 
 120.  See U.S. CONST. art. III; Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).  
 121.  See Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1545 (2016) (holding that a plaintiff does 
not satisfy Article III standing without identifying a concrete harm). 
 122.  Congress explicitly allowed some industries and businesses to obtain the criminal history 
of a job applicant from the FBI.  Examples are nuclear power, securities, banking, nursing homes, 
and critical infrastructure.  See Jacobs & Blitsa, supra note 78, at 192.  For more on mandatory 
background checks for some industries, see infra note 220. 
 123.  15 U.S.C. § 1681k(a)(2). 
 124.  Id. § 1681b(b); Paul-Emile, supra note 73, at 917. 
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While important, these forms of regulation insufficiently address ex-
pungement in the digital age.  Data brokers can easily bypass the obliga-
tions of the FCRA by avoiding categorization as consumer reporting agen-
cies125; employers can conduct background checks on their own without 
data brokers126; the accuracy requirements in the FCRA have proven a 
vague and loose burden on data brokers127; and finally, the FCRA and other 
forms of current regulation do not prohibit disclosure and circulation of ex-
punged conviction records.128 
Essentially, the use of data analysis, combined with the low regulatory 
burden and a market demand for criminal records, threatens expungement.  
But while the threat of data brokers in the digital age was widely acknowl-
edged by policymakers who attempted to regulate them, this practice does 
not even pose the highest risk to rehabilitation in the digital age. 
B.  Online Expungement 
The internet poses a huge threat to expungement.  This mega-database 
allows for the free dissemination of information along with an easy method 
of searching it via search engines and other online intermediaries.  It con-
tains vast amounts of information that could be legally prohibited to share 
kinetically—like health and credit data—but would nevertheless appear and 
remain online.129  Criminal history records in the United States are part of 
this mega-database. 
How does criminal history find its way to the internet?  In various 
ways.130  In some instances, federal and state courthouses in the United 
States offer online records relating to criminal charges and convictions.131  
An individual’s arrest or conviction could be easily reported online and re-
main there via digital archives or services like LexisNexis, Westlaw, or Jus-
                                                          
 125.  One method to avoid being considered a consumer reporting agency would be simply to 
not provide the information in the form of a “consumer report.”  See Wayne, supra note 58, at 269 
n.88. 
 126.  Paul-Emile, supra note 73, at 918. 
 127.  Id.; Wayne, supra note 58, at 270; De Armond, supra note 75, at 1102. 
 128.  See Paul-Emile, supra note 73, at 918. 
 129.  See Frank Pasquale, Reforming the Law of Reputation, 47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 515, 516 
(2015). 
 130.  See Calvert & Bruno, supra note 72, at 135–38 (describing the effectiveness of ex-
pungement on the internet).  
 131.  HOLLY ANDERSON ET AL., AM. ASS’N OF COLLS. OF PHARMACY, REPORT OF THE AACP 
CRIMINAL BACKGROUND CHECK ADVISORY PANEL 5–7 (2006), 
http://www.aacp.org/sites/default/files/2017-11/AACPBackgroundChkRpt.pdf; Privacy/Public 
Access to Court Records: State Links, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
http://www.ncsc.org/topics/access-and-fairness/privacy-public-access-to-court-records/state-
links.aspx (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). 
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tia.132  Another method is via for-profit websites (“mugshot websites”), 
such as Mugshots.com, which post booking photographs taken during an 
investigation (mugshots), along with information on the arrest.133  These 
mugshots generally remain online regardless of the outcome of the investi-
gation or expungement.134  Jailbase.com currently even offers users the abil-
ity to “get notified if someone [they] know gets arrested.”135  Media reports, 
mainly local ones, could publish information on the alleged criminal con-
duct of individuals.136  Finally, criminal histories could be posted online via 
end-users, blogs, social media,137 or any other website with user-generated 
content. 
Current legislation—namely the FCRA—generally does not regulate 
employers or end-users when they access criminal justice information via 
the internet.138  Regardless of whether they are expunged, publishing crimi-
nal history records online is considered lawful.  Such publication, however, 
poses a huge threat to the social collateral consequences of individuals with 
expunged criminal records.  Employers, landlords, educational institutions, 
and any other interested party can easily and freely use search engines and 
even mobile apps to screen individuals.139  As long as the details of an indi-
vidual’s criminal history remain online, expungement statutes will not like-
ly advance the rationales behind rehabilitation.  These individuals will be 
                                                          
 132.  See LEXISNEXIS, www.lexisnexis.com (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); WESTLAW, 
www.westlaw.com (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); JUSTIA, www.justia.com (last visited Dec. 21, 
2017). 
 133.  See, e.g., FAQ, MUGSHOTS, http://mugshots.com/faq.html (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); 
ARRESTS, https://www.arrests.org (last visited Dec. 21, 2017) (providing searches for arrest rec-
ords by state); BUSTED! MUGSHOTS, http://www.bustedmugshots.com (last visited Dec. 21, 
2017); JUST MUGSHOTS, https://justmugshots.us (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). 
 134.  Some of these websites used to offer unpublished information for a fee. This practice, 
however, seemed to cease recently, probably due to its questioned lawfulness.  See David Kravets, 
Judge Spanks Mugshots.com Hard for Charging for Photo Removal, ARS TECHNICA (Sept. 27, 
2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/09/mugshot-website-must-face-class-action-for-
charging-to-remove-photos. 
 135.  See JAILBASE, http://www.jailbase.com (last visited Dec. 21, 2017).  
 136.  Consider an incident that occurred in 2010 in Connecticut.  Lorraine Martin and her two 
sons were arrested at their home on drug charges, and the incident was widely reported in local 
media. CCRC Staff, Publishers Not Liable for Internet Posting of “Erased” Arrest Records, 
COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (Jan. 30, 2015), 
http://ccresourcecenter.org/2015/01/30/publishers-not-liable-internet-posting-erased-arrest-
records.  After a year, the state decided to drop all charges, and consequently erased her record.  
Id.  The contemporaneous news accounts remained available online.  Id.  In turn, a federal court 
dismissed any claims against the publishers, and the content remained actionable online.  Id.; Mar-
tin v. Hearst Corp., 77 F.3d 546, 548 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 137.  To emphasize this phenomenon, Mugshots.com offers to “like” or “tweet” their posts.  
MUGSHOTS, http://mugshots.com (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). 
 138.  See Paul-Emile, supra note 73, at 918. 
 139.  See, e.g., GOOGLE PLAY, JailBase, 
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.jailbase.mobile_app (last visited Dec. 21 2017). 
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unable to reintegrate into society as their criminal history will remain wide-
ly available to anyone who wishes to search for them online. 
Paradoxically, the wide availability of information could even make 
the mere existence of expungement requests more harmful.  If the mere fact 
that one sought an expungement is available online, such requests could en-
hance the negative effects of an individual’s criminal history, as they would 
make the criminal record more visible.140  Thus, not only will the kinetic 
world’s zoning of expungement be ineffective in the digital era, it could be 
more harmful than ever before. 
Criminal rehabilitation in the digital era requires policymakers to 
acknowledge the differences between expungement in the kinetic world and 
the digital world and seek proper solutions.  The lack of a digital expunge-
ment right increases the possibility of recidivism, broadens the scope of un-
lawful discrimination based on race,141 gender, and national origin142 (all of 
which would be unlawful for employment purposes),143 reinforces socioec-
onomic inequity, negatively impacts the labor market and the development 
of knowledge,144 and generally inflicts unnecessary harm on individuals—
most importantly juveniles,145 their families and society.  If we do not ena-
ble a real possibility of reintegration into society, we risk recidivism, which 
in turn will lead to even greater incarceration in already overcrowded pris-
                                                          
 140.  Pasquale, supra note 129, at 516 (“[I]t is not much good for an ex-convict to expunge his 
juvenile record, if the fact of his conviction is the top Google result for searches on his name for 
the rest of his life.”). 
 141.  See Lewis Maltby, How to Fairly Hire Applicants with Criminal Records, DIVERSITYINC 
(Aug. 24, 2011), http://www.diversityinc.com/legal-issues/how-to-fairly-hire-applicants-with-
criminal-records (arguing that more than fifty percent of Black males in the United States have a 
criminal record).  For statistics on the racial impact in mass incarceration, see, for example, Crim-
inal Justice Facts, supra note 23.  For more on racial disparities in the American criminal system, 
see Roberts, supra note 32, at 331.  
 142.  See THOMAS P. BONCZAR, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PREVALENCE OF IMPRISONMENT IN 
THE U.S. POPULATION, 1974–2001, at 5 (2003), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/piusp01.pdf. 
 143.  See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits employment discrimination 
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.  Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-
352, tit. VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 241, 253–66 (1964). 
 144.  Under this argument, the labor market suffers a negative impact when we disqualify 
many qualified members of society, and the development of knowledge suffers as worthy appli-
cants for education will be rejected due to their expunged criminal history. 
 145.  Another major concern regarding the internet involves juvenile records.  The internet 
could make juvenile expungement irrelevant even if some policymakers decided to specifically 
ban access to records of juvenile adjudications.  A single post on social media about a classmate’s 
wrongdoing could stay online forever, and it could be accessible to any future educator, employer 
or landlord.  Without digital expungement of these records, those individuals will have little 
chance of reintegrating into society, and chances of recidivism will increase. 
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ons and increased financial expenses.146  Ultimately, it would be taxpayers 
who would bear the financial costs of recidivism. 
Arguably, the lack of a digital expungement right could undermine the 
pillars of criminal law.  The increase in the social collateral consequences 
from the use of digital technology could effectively impose a punishment 
beyond the sentence prescribed by law, which could be perceived as ille-
gal147 or even unconstitutional.148  But mainly, the absence of this right re-
duces the effectiveness of rehabilitation and leads to undesired results 
which could be harmful from a social perspective.  Intervention is, there-
fore, much needed. 
IV.  ENABLING DIGITAL EXPUNGEMENT 
The regulation of expunged criminal histories would be difficult under 
the U.S. legal system due mostly to constitutional constraints on impeding 
free speech and freedom of the press.  The firmly rooted perception that 
criminal histories are public records would also be problematic.  Any such 
form of regulation would, therefore, require acknowledging the potential 
legal, social, and technological barriers, understanding their consequences, 
and examining whether intervention could both be legally feasible and 
pragmatically aid in rehabilitation. 
                                                          
 146.  The Pew Center stated in 2008 that spending on corrections eclipsed $49 billion.  ONE IN 
100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA IN 2008, supra note 23, at 11.  In 2012, slowdown and incarcera-
tion costs continued to rise.  According to another report, state spending for corrections reached 
$52.4 billion. NAT’L ASS’N OF STATE BUDGET OFFICES, STATE SPENDING FOR CORRECTIONS: 
LONG-TERM TRENDS AND RECENT CRIMINAL JUSTICE POLICY REFORMS 1 (Sept. 11, 2013), 
https://higherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/NASBO/0f09ced0-449d-4c11-b787-
10505cd90bb9/UploadedImages/Issue%20Briefs%20/State%20Spending%20for%20Corrections.
pdf. 
 147.  However, collateral consequences could also be considered a form of civil regulation that 
operates outside the criminal justice system.  See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. 
STATE LAWS, UNIF. COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CONVICTION ACT 3 (2010), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/collateral_consequences/uccca_final_10.pdf; Gabriel J. 
Chin, Are Collateral Sanctions Premised on Conduct or Conviction?: The Case of Abortion Doc-
tors, 30 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1685, 1686 n.10 (2003). 
 148.  Arguably, such punishment could be considered a violation of the Eighth Amendment as 
a cruel and unusual punishment under a retributive justice’s proportionality principle.  See Chin, 
supra note 47, at 1792, 1826.  However, collateral consequences were held not to constitute a pun-
ishment.  Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 95–96 (2003).  Furthermore, failure to acknowledge or to be 
informed on them was held not to violate the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of 
a counsel and the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment due process standards.  See, e.g., Steele v. Mur-
phy, 365 F.3d 14, 17 (1st Cir. 2004); State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799, 803 (N.M. 2004); Chin & 
Holmes, supra note 32, at 699–701 (discussing the constitutional debate regarding collateral con-
sequences); Jenny Roberts, The Mythical Divide Between Collateral and Direct Consequences of 
Criminal Convictions: Involuntary Commitment of “Sexually Violent Predators”, 93 MINN. L. 
REV. 670, 672–82 (2008) (summarizing the constitutional debate regarding collateral consequenc-
es surrounding a guilty plea and proposing a “reasonableness standard” for the duty to warn and 
the due process right). 
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In essence, digital expungement could be achieved by either ex-ante or 
ex-post measures.  Using the law, technology, the market, or social forc-
es,149 either separately or combined, could make expunged criminal histo-
ries either initially unavailable (ex-ante), or make them inaccessible or un-
usable once expunged (ex-post).  Notably, other foreign jurisdictions, like 
many member states of the EU, incorporated both ex-ante and ex-post 
measures into their legal system. 
From an ex-ante perspective, criminal history records, usually includ-
ing convictions, are considered by many EU member states as personal in-
formation not available to the public.  While court records must generally 
be “fair and public,” and any judgments must be pronounced publicly, the 
EU permits placing restrictions on reporting cases by the press and, in some 
instances, even affording anonymity to defendants prior to or after convic-
tion.150  The EU also generally restricts the practices of data brokers provid-
ing criminal histories.151  Thus, there is no general need for digital ex-
pungement in many EU member states as criminal history records are rarely 
made publicly available. 
From an ex-post perspective, the EU went a step further by granting 
individuals the right to control their personal data, which potentially en-
sured digital expungement.  It is not clear whether the EU intended to in-
clude criminal history records within the scope of this right when it origi-
nated in 1995.152  However, the recent expansion of control over personal 
                                                          
 149.  See infra note 154. 
 150.  Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 6, Nov. 
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.  While Article 6 of the Convention of Human Rights requires that 
“everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing,” it does not necessarily rule out the possibility of 
placing limits on the media or the use of anonymity to defendants.  Id. 
 151.  Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 
prohibits the creation of private criminal record databases.  See Council Directive 95/46 of Oct. 
24, 1995, Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the 
Free Movement of Such Data, art. 8.5, 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31 (EC) (repealed 2016). 
 152.  The right to control personal information is rooted within Article 6 of EU Data Protection 
Directive from 1995.  Id. art. 6.  The Directive obliges member states to guarantee that every data 
subject has the right to obtain from the controller “the rectification, erasure or blocking of data the 
processing of which does not comply with the provisions of this Directive, in particular because of 
the incomplete or inaccurate nature of the data.”  Id. art. 12.  Specifically, Article 6 ensures that 
personal data must be:  
(a) processed fairly and lawfully; (b) collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes . . . .  Further processing of data for historical, statistical, or scientific purposes 
shall not be considered as incompatable provided that Member States provide appropri-
ate safeguards; (c) adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the purposes for 
which they are collected and/or further processed; (d) accurate and, where necessary, 
kept up to date . . . ; [and] (e) kept in a form which permits identification of data sub-
jects for no longer than is necessary for the purposes for which the data were collected 
or for which they are further processed . . . . 
Id. art. 6. 
 2018] DIGITAL EXPUNGEMENT 361 
 
data online within the so-called “right to be forgotten” or “right of erasure,” 
would likely apply to expunged criminal history records.153 
The EU ex-post approach would be highly problematic, however, un-
der the current U.S. legal regime.  As this Article further suggests, any at-
tempt to regulate expunged criminal history ex-post is doomed to fail in the 
United States.  Only ex-ante measures—which would necessitate a concep-
tual change in the categorization of criminal history as public records—can 
aid in enabling digital (and kinetic) expungement.  This Part scrutinizes the 
efficacy of both ex-post and ex-ante measures in enabling digital expunge-
ment.  It begins by examining the almost impossible ex-post solution, par-
tially implemented in the United States, followed by an analysis of potential 
ex-ante solutions, which may be the only pragmatic solutions for digital ex-
pungement in the United States. 
A.  Ex-Post Expungement: Removing Expunged Data 
An ex-post approach to digital expungement would generally mean 
that a criminal history record, once expunged, would either become inac-
cessible by any non-governmental entity, or that the dissemination or use of 
expunged records by non-governmental entities would be illegal.  An ex-
post approach does not necessarily require legal intervention, and it could 
potentially also be achieved via other modalities of regulation like social, 
market, and code (technology).154  However, as this Section further shows, 
implementing an ex-post approach would be difficult or ineffective for 
achieving the goals of digital expungement mainly because it is not legally 
possible. 
                                                          
 153.  Eldar Haber, Privatization of the Judiciary, 40 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 115, 118 (2016).  The 
right to be forgotten—also known as a right to be delisted or right of erasure—is designed to ena-
ble “a data subject (an individual) to ‘obtain from the controller the erasure of personal data con-
cerning him or her without undue delay and the controller shall have the obligation to erase per-
sonal data without undue delay.’”  Id. at 123 (quoting Council Regulation 2016/679, art. 17, 2016 
O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU)).  In a 2014 case interpreting the EU Data Protection Directive, the European 
Court of Justice granted the right to be forgotten to EU data subjects.  See Case C-131/12, Google 
Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos, 2014 E.C.R. 317.  In 2016, the EU passed 
the General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”), which grants its citizens or residents a right to 
delete information from the internet upon meeting these criteria, and it will go into effect in 2018.  
Council Regulation 2016/679, supra, at art. 28.3(a).  For more on the right to be forgotten, see 
Haber, supra. 
 154.  See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: VERSION 2.0 120–37 (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE 
CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND 
CONTROL CREATIVITY 116–73 (2004).  Michael Birnhack suggested that social norms and the 
market could be addressed as one because crediting importance to the free market makes it a so-
cial value.  See Michael O. Birnhack, Lex Machina: Data Security and the Computer Act, 4 
SHA’AREY MISHPAT 315, 320 n.13 (2006) [Hebrew]. 
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1.  Market and Social Norms 
Market and social norms cannot solve the problem of expunged rec-
ords being held or made available by non-governmental entities or online 
sources.155  One of the main obstacles is the demand for criminal histories, 
which was met (with or without a causative link) by a substantial growth in 
the last few years in the market of data brokers and online platforms that of-
fer such information.156  As long as employers, landlords, educational insti-
tutions, and other interested parties are in need of such information, and in 
many instances, are willing to pay for it, market forces are unlikely to push 
against the supply.  Potentially, consumers could push back against the high 
costs of these services, thereby decreasing demand.157  Practice, however, 
indicates that these businesses still thrive despite relatively high prices, and 
as long as there is a willingness to pay, it will be generally insufficient to 
rely on the market to solve this problem.  At best, consumer demand will 
merely affect the pricing of criminal history records.  It will fail to affect the 
wide availability of information, which will not be regulated by these mar-
ket forces as long as much of this information remains free of charge online. 
While consumers are not likely to push against the availability of crim-
inal history records, presumably they could demand that the market provide 
only information that is up-to-date, that is, demand that the market remove 
any expunged records.  However, it seems that in this context, a relatively 
unusual market for inaccurate, incomplete, or more precisely, non-updated 
data, was created.  Market players—including both data brokers and online 
services—were simply not incentivized to exclude expunged records from 
their databases. 
Indeed, there was much incentive to include them.  Beyond the finan-
cial cost of updating databases, many employers, landlords, and educational 
institutions would prefer to obtain a criminal history record that contains 
expunged conduct to know the complete criminal history of a prospect, re-
gardless of the state’s rationale for expunging it.158  Thus, market players 
not only lack incentives for updating their databases, but they are rather in-
                                                          
 155.  See CRIMNET PROGRAM OFFICE ET AL., COMMERCIAL DATA MINING OF CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM RECORDS: DELIVERY TEAM REPORT TO THE CRIMINAL AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 
INFORMATION TASK FORCE 14 (Aug. 2008), 
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2009/mandated/090200.pdf [hereinafter COMMERCIAL DATA 
MINING] (discussing the benefits and drawbacks of imposing no regulation on data mining entities 
and allowing the market to self-regulate). 
 156.  Wayne, supra note 58, at 262–63. 
 157.  One data broker, for example, charges $29.95 for every “National Criminal Background 
Check.”  It also offers up to a 50% discount for consumers who purchase over twenty-five search-
es.  See BACKGROUNDCHECKS, http://www.backgroundchecks.com/volumepricing (last visited 
Dec. 21, 2017).  For price examples in 2005, see THE COMMERCIAL SALE REPORT, supra note 93, 
at 14–15. 
 158.  Id. at 83–84. 
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centivized to supply services specifically targeted at learning about the ex-
punged records of individuals.  Therefore, while there is a plausible demand 
for updated databases—which could incentivize market players to improve 
their practices, and thereby increase chances of success for digital ex-
pungement—such demand is improbable. 
The availability of free online information seems to produce similar 
outcomes from a market perspective.  Online sources and other intermediar-
ies (like search engines), which grant access to criminal history records, are 
also unlikely to change their behavior through market forces.  Without a 
shift in the perception of the proper use and retention of personal data 
online,159 these providers are unlikely to grant individuals the ability to re-
move information about themselves, including records that were expunged. 
In addition, whether self-deployed or through a third party, individuals 
could try to reduce accessibility to harmful online content by manipulating 
search results so that the harmful results will appear much lower in the 
search engine’s output.160  While this demand has already created websites 
offering so-called “reputation management services,”161 such services are 
generally limited to affecting search results, and their efficacy depends on 
the financial resources and knowledge of the service. 
In addition to the market, or combined with it, social norms are also 
fairly limited in their ability to aid digital expungement efforts.  While at-
                                                          
 159.  See Chris Conley, The Right to Delete, AAAI SPRING SYMP.: INTELLIGENT INFO. 
PRIVACY MGMT. 53, 58 (2010), 
https://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/SSS/SSS10/paper/viewFile/1158/1482 (“If members of socie-
ty can agree that individuals deserve the right to own their own digital persona, including records 
that are held by third parties, then a right to delete can be established absent any legal change.  
Private individuals will find a negotiated means of complying with requests to delete information 
(assuming that they even retain information in searchable form), and market actors will adapt to 
changing consumer expectations.”). 
 160.  The market or social norms could potentially lead search engines to offer services that 
could aid in digital expungement.  One such service could remove links upon request or make 
them practically invisible in a search query.  A strong demand for this kind of service could lead 
consumers to use search engines that offer the service and abstain from using search engines that 
do not.  But these potential mechanisms would be highly controversial and unlikely, as they would 
allow for the censorship of large swaths of information.  Mainly, they require search engines to act 
against their business models, which rely on information.  For a review on the market and social 
norms as potentially regulating the availability of online information, see Haber, supra note 153, 
at 162–63. 
 161.  For example, Webcide.com “employs advanced techniques and patented technologies to 
help push the content you want to see higher up the search engine pages, whilst effectively push-
ing the detrimental content beyond page 1.”  Online Reputation Management Services by 
Webcide.com Now in Abuja, Nigeria, WEBCIDE, https://www.webcide.com/online-reputation-
management-nigeria (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); see also BRANDYOURSELF, 
https://brandyourself.com/about (last visited Dec. 21, 2017) (offering its subscribers the chance to 
“clean up, protect and improve your online reputation”).  RemoveSlander offers reputation man-
agement services and website suppression.  See REMOVESLANDER, 
http://www.removeslander.com (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). 
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tempts have been made to raise awareness and improve the ability to erase 
expunged records from databases,162 such efforts will be insufficient to 
solve the problem as long as there is high demand for criminal background 
checks, and especially when many users of this information would most 
likely prefer the inclusion of criminal history that was expunged.  General-
ly, change in the market would require the acknowledgment of a proprietary 
right in personal information, and only then could market actors adapt to 
changing consumer expectations.  This change, however, is unrealistic un-
der the American view of personal data.  While online intermediaries some-
times include the possibility of data removal in their policies, without any 
visible or direct form of regulation obliging them to do so, such removal is 
usually reserved for content around which a strong negative consensus has 
formed, like child pornography and revenge porn.163  The nature of ex-
pungement—which varies from state to state—will not likely lead to such 
consensus.  Thus, unless users of criminal history records acknowledge and 
mutually agree on the importance of expungement, social norms will not 
likely aid. 
In a more limited context, social norms might reduce the practice of 
publishing mugshots.  Even prior to legal proceedings against the practice 
of requesting payment for removal of mugshots—of which outcomes are 
currently unknown164—some payment companies found this practice activi-
ty repugnant and decided to drop mugshot websites as customers.165  Cur-
rently, even though this practice is limited to one form of online criminal 
history—that of mugshot websites—this strategy will not likely succeed in 
the long run since other methods of payment could replace the traditional, 
currency based, payment companies (for example, e-currency).  Potentially, 
social norms could drive search engines to restrict linking to these websites 
in their policies without regulation.166  However, aside from the fact that 
                                                          
 162.  Projects like The Expunged Record attempt to aid individuals with expunged records to 
reintegrate into society by raising awareness to the practices of data brokers; listing active data 
brokers with verified mailing addresses and contact information; providing a case-by-case advice, 
referrals, and recommendations; or even managing the enforcement process for individuals.  
EXPUNGED RECORD, https://www.theexpungedrecord.com (last visited Dec. 21, 2017).  
 163.  Google, for example, will remove links to “sensitive personal information” like child 
sexual abuse imagery and revenge porn.  Removal Policies, GOOGLE, 
https://support.google.com/websearch/answer/2744324 (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); see also Joan-
na Walters, Google to Exclude ‘Revenge Porn’ from Internet Searches, GUARDIAN (June 21, 
2015), http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/jun/20/google-excludes-revenge-porn-
internet-searches.  For more on legal mechanisms to deal with revenge porn, see Danielle Keats 
Citron & Mary Anne Franks, Criminalizing Revenge Porn, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 345 (2014). 
 164.  See Class Action Complaint at Law and Equity, Babiola v. Keesee, No. 1:16-cv-02076 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 9, 2016).  
 165.  David Segal, Mugged by a Mug Shot Online, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/06/business/mugged-by-a-mug-shot-online.html. 
 166.  Id. 
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this solution requires a change in the social norms followed by these web-
sites, search engines, which rely on the wide availability of information 
online, will not likely remove content wholesale without regulation, even if 
they operate in a monopolistic or an oligopolistic market. 
2.  Technology 
Technology has created the need for digital expungement and could al-
so play a role in aiding it.  The use of technology greatly influenced the 
market for criminal history records with the shift to digital data practices.  
The government could try to turn the tables by ceasing the practice of sell-
ing data sets of criminal histories.  Instead, the government could sell each 
record separately (and charge per-record fees) or simply allow only direct 
access to updated databases run and overseen by the government.167  Then, 
the efficacy of digital expungement should improve as the data mining in-
dustry will be forced to go back to a case-by-case request paradigm.168  
However, this would require a change in practice by the government, which 
would be difficult to achieve absent some substantial incentive other than 
legal intervention. Moreover, it would not affect the data sets that were al-
ready sold. 
Other potential technological solutions (with or without the use of law) 
will generally require a pragmatic solution for automatically updating crim-
inal records gathered by third parties.  Such solutions could be in the form 
of setting expiration dates on data;169 offering individuals a “reputation 
bankruptcy,”170 which would give them the ability to de-emphasize, anon-
ymize, or entirely delete online information about themselves from time to 
time; or shaping search engine algorithms to de-emphasize certain websites 
                                                          
 167.  While not applying to court records, the Privacy Act of 1974 grants individuals a right to 
access and correct information about themselves held by federal agencies and restricts federal 
agencies’ collection, use, and disclosure of personal information.  Subsequently, individuals are 
entitled to review their records upon request and ask to correct inaccurate data, and they could 
bring civil actions against the agency for failure to comply.  See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)–(g) (2012); 
Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86 
MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (2002). 
 168.  See COMMERCIAL DATA MINING, supra note 155, at 29 (discussing the advantages and 
disadvantages of this proposal). 
 169.  For this potential solution in the context of privacy and data control, see VIKTOR MAYER-
SCHÖNBERGER, DELETE: THE VIRTUE OF FORGETTING IN THE DIGITAL AGE 171–95, 198 (2009); 
Haber, supra note 153, at 160; Jeffrey Rosen, The Deciders: The Future of Privacy and Free 
Speech in the Age of Facebook and Google, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1525, 1535 (2012); Michael L. 
Rustad & Sanna Kulevska, Reconceptualizing the Right to Be Forgotten to Enable Transatlantic 
Data Flow, 28 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 349, 382–84 (2015). 
 170.  See JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 228–29 
(2008). 
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that offer criminal history records.  Google has already attempted to do the 
latter,171 but the change is fairly limited to mugshot websites. 
Other than search engine changes, these technological solutions are 
problematic in the context of criminal history records.  For instance, expira-
tion dates are not ideal because expungement is ex-post in nature, and it oc-
curs mostly under discretion of courts.  Other propositions would not ad-
vance digital expungement enough, would be highly difficult (if not almost 
impossible to conduct), would be time-consuming, and would most likely 
require legal intervention, which would be difficult to achieve.  Technology 
is therefore insufficient, on its own, to aid in digital expungement ex-post, 
especially without concomitant changes in market forces, changes in social 
norms, or legal intervention.  As mentioned, due to the uniqueness of the 
market for non-updated information, even practical technological solutions 
are unlikely to be implemented by commercial entities. 
3.  Law 
Both Congress and state legislatures have acknowledged the need to 
use legislation to reduce the consequences of expungement in the digital 
era.  These ex-post legal measures could improve the chances of digital re-
habilitation, as they target both data brokers and some online platforms 
such as mugshot websites.  However, while important, current legal 
measures are still limited in their scope, as this Section further analyzes, 
and are therefore insufficient to properly address the need for digital ex-
pungement. 
One of the legal methods deployed was based on deterrence.  At both 
the federal and state levels, policymakers imposed liability on data brokers 
that stored and divulged criminal history records if they were not kept up-
to-date.  On the federal level,172 the FCRA imposed various obligations on 
data brokers.  Federal legislation, however, was limited in its ability to deal 
with criminal history records.173  Moreover, it seems that it was insufficient, 
as data brokers were not deterred by potential sanctions and liability for 
                                                          
 171.  See Fields & Emshwiller, supra note 84 (“In the past year Google Inc. has changed its 
search algorithm to de-emphasize many so called ‘mug-shot’ websites, giving them less promi-
nence when someone’s name is searched.”). 
 172.  See supra Part III.A.  
 173.  The inter-jurisdictional nature of the U.S. penal system could make uniformity problem-
atic.  Any attempt to legislate federal laws that will supposedly unify digital rehabilitation will 
most likely exclude criminal conduct regulated differently across the United States—some states 
do not have expungement statutes or have relatively limited ones.  See Wayne, supra note 58, at 
278 (excluding “variations in state laws with respect to felony, juvenile, and sex-related convic-
tions”). 
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breaking the law.174  On the state level, a few states prohibited data brokers 
from producing reports containing, inter alia, arrests, indictments, or con-
victions, usually after some time period has elapsed.175  Some states at-
tempted to ensure that criminal history information is kept up-to-date by 
setting deadlines for updates.176 
From a consumer perspective, the FCRA and state legislation do not 
provide adequate protection from the harms caused by the use of digital da-
ta.177  Individuals are unlikely to succeed in bringing private suits based on 
privacy violations. 178  The publication of truthful information on their crim-
inal history—even if it was expunged—is unlikely to violate their right to 
privacy.179  A potential legal solution would be to grant them a cause of ac-
                                                          
 174.  While not by a formal statement, it is interesting to note that a staff attorney at the Feder-
al Trade Commission even warned data brokers that “[e]xpunged records may not be reported be-
cause legally they don’t exist,” but that warning did not lead to changing their practices.  Palazzo-
lo, supra note 25. 
 175.  Take Montana, Nevada, and Washington as examples.  Montana prohibits consumer re-
porting agencies to make any consumer report containing, inter alia, arrests, indictments, or con-
victions more than seven years old.  MONT. CODE ANN. § 31-3-112 (West 2015).  Also, all rec-
ords and data relating to a criminal charge, after dismissal following deferred imposition of 
sentence, become confidential and accessible only by a court order.  Id. § 46-18-204.  Nevada re-
quires reporting agencies not to disclose a report of criminal proceedings, or other adverse infor-
mation, excluding a record of a conviction of a crime, which precedes the report by more than 
seven years.  NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 598C.150(2) (LexisNexis 2010).  Washington prohibits the 
dissemination of arrest records, indictments, or records of crime conviction older than seven years 
from the date of disposition, release, or parole.  WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.182.040 (West 
2013). 
 176.  In Connecticut for example, consumer reporting agencies are required on a monthly basis 
or other schedule set by the Judicial Department to update records and permanently delete any 
“criminal matters of public record” obtained from the Judicial Department.  See CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. § 54-142e (West 2009). 
 177.  See supra Part III. 
 178.  Consider this key example of an attempt to use the tort of defamation as a viable cause 
for action regarding expungement.  On June 12, 2006, a Superior Court judge in New Jersey 
granted G.D. a petition for an order expunging records of drug conviction, arrest and the charges.  
See G.D. v. Kenny, 15 A.3d 300, 305 (N.J. 2011).  After the expungement, political smear fliers 
referring to the convictions were distributed by members of an opposing candidate’s staff of G.D. 
(at that time, an aide to a political candidate in New Jersey).  Id. at 305–06.  In return, G.D. filed 
for a defamation suit.  Id. at 304.  In G.D. v. Kenny, the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in favor 
of the defendant on grounds of a truth defense protected by the First Amendment (expungement 
does not mean that criminal history is untrue) and on the grounds that expungement does not di-
rectly lead to a reasonable expectation of privacy.  Id. at 314, 321; see also Eagle v. Morgan, 88 
F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 1996) (“[S]tate laws, such as Arkansas’ expungement provisions, do not 
establish the parameters of constitutional rights, like the right to privacy, that are grounded in sub-
stantive theories of due process.”); Nilson v. Layton City, 45 F.3d 369, 372 (10th Cir. 1995) (not-
ing that the “disclosed information itself must warrant constitutional protection” but that an ex-
punged criminal record “is not protected by the constitutional right to privacy”); Wayne, supra 
note 58, at 271–74. 
 179.  Under the invasion of privacy tort claim, individuals with expunged records could poten-
tially argue that any publication of facts regarding their expunged criminal history could constitute 
an invasion of privacy.  These claims, however, are unlikely to prevail.  See, e.g., Gates v. Dis-
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tion to recover damages for either negligence or intentional dissemination 
of expunged information.180  This solution, however, might pose at least 
two main constitutional challenges.  First, under the constitutional standing 
doctrine, individuals might lack a private right of action to file suit without 
demonstrating an injury in fact.181  Second, this solution poses constitution-
al challenges of impeding speech, which will be further discussed in the 
next Section.  Aside from the constitutional aspects, private causes of action 
will be generally insufficient as they could be costly and difficult to prove, 
among other barriers.182 
Few policymakers have attempted to regulate criminal history records 
from the aspect of their end use by, inter alia, potential employers and land-
lords.  Some states required employers to use a fair employment policy like 
ban the box.183  By law, many employers must refrain from asking about an 
individual’s criminal history (in many instances until the interview phase or 
a late stage in the process).184  Moreover, both federal and state laws gener-
ally prohibit employment discrimination based upon criminal history, which 
includes arrests and even some convictions.185  These initiatives have been 
met with some criticism in the kinetic world.186  But beyond criticism of 
banning the physical box, banning the digital box—and generally placing 
limitations on end users—is not pragmatic.  It would be nearly impossi-
ble—and unwise to a great extent—for policymakers to regulate what end 
users are doing online.  Such policies would censor the use of the internet, 
would not be enforceable,187 and would not likely be constitutional. 
There are other ex-post legal measures that could be deployed, at least 
theoretically.  Congress could place an affirmative duty on data brokers to 
disclose incorrect information, which could include: removing expunged 
                                                          
covery Commc’ns, Inc., 101 P.3d 552, 562 (Cal. 2004) (“[A]n invasion of privacy claim based on 
allegations of harm caused by a media defendant’s publication of facts obtained from public offi-
cial records of a criminal proceeding is barred by the First Amendment to the United States Con-
stitution.”). 
 180.  See COMMERCIAL DATA MINING, supra note 155, at 23 (discussing the benefits and 
drawbacks of granting data subjects the ability to sue data miners). 
 181.  See supra notes 120–121. 
 182.  See supra notes 120–121.  
 183.  See supra notes 120–121. 
 184.  A few states have adopted some type of ban the box policy that applies to employment.  
See LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 183, at 2; Joshua Gaines, Vermont Becomes 8th State to Ban 
the Box in Private Employment, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (May 5, 2016), 
http://ccresourcecenter.org/2016/05/05/vermont-becomes-8th-state-to-ban-the-box-in-private-and-
public-employment. 
 185.  Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 80, at 212 (listing examples of federal and state legislation 
prohibiting employment discrimination).  
 186.  Jagunic, supra note 104, at 175–76 (criticizing the applicability of “ban the box” initia-
tives). 
 187.  See Jacobs & Crepet, supra note 80, at 212. 
 2018] DIGITAL EXPUNGEMENT 369 
 
convictions188; implementing oversight regimes to enforce any requirement 
that data brokers regularly update their records189; and setting a deadline for 
data brokers to dispose of criminal history records.190  On the state level, 
state legislatures and perhaps state governors could impose further limita-
tions on the dissemination of data by state and local agencies.  States could 
require that agency records always be updated, and that they provide these 
updates to data brokers.191  Enforcement of statutes could be accomplished 
by imposing monetary sanctions on data brokers on a strict liability basis; 
imposing other civil sanctions like revoking or suspending business licens-
es; imposing criminal sanctions; and finally, granting a citizen suit provi-
sion for harms caused by violations.192  To address the fears of employers 
that might face legal liability for negligent hiring, policymakers could sub-
stantially limit this cause of action.193  Regarding end users, policymakers 
could expand and enforce the prohibition against end users being exposed 
to expunged records, or making decisions upon such exposure.194 
Another legal solution would be regulation through information.  We 
can shape expungement statutes so they will provide certificates of recovery 
or relief to individuals with a criminal history who meet the requirements 
set by the law.  Such a certificate—which already exists in some states195—
would be used by individuals with an expunged criminal record when ap-
plying for a job, for example.  Even if the employer searches the candi-
date’s name, he will only find information that the candidate already dis-
closed.  One study on Ohio’s certificates of recovery or relief found that 
such certificates were effective in facilitating employment opportunities for 
                                                          
 188.  See Wayne, supra note 58, at 278. 
 189.  Id. at 279; Brian M. Murray, A New Era for Expungement Law Reform? Recent Devel-
opments at the State and Federal Levels, 10 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 361, 379–80 (2016). 
 190.  See Wayne, supra note 58, at 279. 
 191.  Id. at 280. 
 192.  Id. at 280–81. 
 193.  See, for example, North Carolina’s provision limiting employers’ liability for negligent 
hiring.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-173.5 (2015); LEGAL ACTION CTR., supra note 183, at 6. 
 194.  For other propositions that mostly relate to data brokers, see Roberts, supra note 32, at 
344–45 (discussing methods to limit the use of criminal history). 
 195.  Usually referred to as a “Certificate of Rehabilitation” or a “Certificate of Good Con-
duct,” a few states created such certificates of recovery or relief, intended to lift occupational li-
censing restrictions, limit employer liability for negligent hiring or retention lawsuits, and ensure 
employment decisions about certificate-holders are made on a case-by-case basis.  See Pierre H. 
Bergeron & Kimberly A. Eberwine, One Step in the Right Direction: Ohio’s Framework for Seal-
ing Criminal Records, 36 U. TOL. L. REV. 595, 596 (2005); Peter Leasure & Tia Stevens Ander-
sen, The Effectiveness of Certificates of Relief as Collateral Consequence Relief Mechanisms: An 
Experimental Study, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. INTER ALIA 11 (2016), 
http://ylpr.yale.edu/sites/default/files/IA/leasure.certificates_of_relief.produced.pdf; Irina Kash-
cheyeva, Comment, Reaching a Compromise: How to Save Michigan Ex-Offenders from Unem-
ployment and Michigan Employers from Negligent Hiring Liability, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1051, 
1077 (2007). 
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people with a criminal record.196  But as effective as these certificates may 
be, the fact remains that the mere knowledge of criminal history could still 
play an important role in the employer’s decision regardless of rehabilita-
tion,197 and the employer might still fear potential tort liability for negligent 
hiring.  Therefore, a certification program cannot fulfill the purpose of ex-
pungement—that is, to make it as if the individual never offended in the 
first place. 
Contextualization is another potential form of remedy.  The state can 
issue a digital certificate of rehabilitation sent to content providers directly.  
Upon receiving a verified certificate of rehabilitation, content providers will 
allow individuals to add context to links—information next to any reference 
to the criminal history that was expunged.  It should be noted that compel-
ling content providers to allow contextualization text might be unconstitu-
tional as compelled speech and could potentially violate the First Amend-
ment, because the government cannot oblige expression against one’s 
will.198  However, if the government merely incentivizes this behavior by 
granting, for example, a safe harbor from liability, then the constitutional 
debate might not arise.  Having said that, contextualization would still be 
insufficient due to the potential bias of end users.199 
To specifically deal with the practice of mugshot websites, policymak-
ers could reduce their profitability by restricting the practice of charging 
fees for removal (their so-called extortion practices), or any other financial 
gains from their operations.200  While proscribing this practice altogether 
                                                          
 196.  Leasure & Andersen, supra note 195, at 20. 
 197.  See TRAVIS ET AL., supra note 30, at 31 (citing a survey that indicated that “two-thirds of 
all employers indicated they would not knowingly hire an ex-offender and at least one-third 
checked the criminal histories of their most recently hired employees”); Jacobs, supra note 42, at 
390 (“Employers often associate a criminal record with unreliability, untrustworthiness, and dan-
gerousness.”); Mayfield, supra note 61, at 1064 (“[J]ob applicants with criminal records face sub-
stantial obstacles in gaining work because of the biases held against them by many employers.”); 
Pager, supra note 41, at 942–43 (noting that employers are strongly averse to hiring ex-offenders); 
Richard D. Schwartz & Jerome H. Skolnick, Two Studies of Legal Stigma, 10 SOC. PROBS. 133, 
136 (1962). 
 198.  See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 707, 717 (1977) (holding that it is not con-
stitutionally permitted for New Hampshire statutes to require that noncommercial motor vehicles 
bear license plates embossed with the state motto “Live Free or Die”). 
 199.  See supra note 197. 
 200.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.91.1 (West 2009) (prohibiting publishers of a booking 
photograph from soliciting, requiring, or accepting a fee or other consideration from a subject in-
dividual, as defined, to remove, correct, modify, or to refrain from publishing or otherwise dis-
seminating that photograph, as specified); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-72-305.5 (West 2015); 
815 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 505/2QQQ (West 2008 & Supp. 2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 17-22-
30 (LexisNexis 2013).  For a full review of state legislation that places limitations on such web-
sites, see Mug Shots and Booking Photo Websites, NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (Feb. 3, 
2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/mug-shots-
and-booking-photo-websites.aspx. 
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might be difficult, if not almost constitutionally impermissible as such re-
strictions could raise First Amendment concerns,201 it appears that these ex-
tortion practices have ceased for now.202  Still, even upon regulating direct 
profits of these websites, it is rather intuitive that as long as there will be a 
market demand for this information, their operators will find a legal way to 
still make profits. Subsequently, these restrictions could perhaps lead to the 
formation of grey or black markets for this type of information. 
Perhaps the only effective ex-post solution for enabling digital ex-
pungement is to follow the EU’s recognition of control over personal in-
formation.  This solution would grant individuals a legal right to compel ei-
ther the holder of information or other entities that grant access to it, to 
update or remove such information, and thus make it inaccessible to the 
public.203  Furthermore, individuals could be granted a legal right to sue 
over the public disclosure of private facts, as publishing this information 
serves no public purpose.204  If the United States were to follow the EU in 
granting a right of erasure, even if narrowly tailored only to deal with ex-
punged criminal history records, then data subjects could be granted the 
ability to reintegrate into society. 
Under this approach, individuals would be granted the right to ap-
proach any holder of information (including data brokers and online pro-
viders) and demand that they delete and cease disseminating criminal histo-
ry records that were expunged.  A narrowly tailored right to be forgotten (or 
right of erasure) regarding expunged records could take this form: Individu-
als whose criminal history was expunged will be granted a certificate of ex-
pungement, preferably in a digital form.  Then, they would send an online 
form (which would also be available offline, for individuals without access 
to technology or with low technological capabilities) to a state agency re-
questing the removal of their expunged records from data brokers’ data-
bases and from search engines with sites that contain expunged information 
appearing upon a search for their names.  For purposes of convenience, and 
to raise awareness about this right, every search engine will make the form 
accessible from their removal policy page.  Data brokers, under this new 
approach, will be required to register and be licensed by the state in order to 
                                                          
 201.  See Segal, supra note 165. 
 202.  Recently, several states, including Florida, made it illegal to charge fees for the removal 
of mugshots. See S.B. 118, 2017 Leg., 119th Sess. (Fla. 2017) (enacted), 
http://laws.flrules.org/2017/130.  It would be interesting to see if these laws will be challenged on 
First Amendment grounds. 
 203.  Arguably, courts could attempt to restrict the availability of expunged records as a mani-
festation of their inherent power to enforce their orders. See United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 
Cranch.) 32 (1812). The question is whether the availability of information online undermines the 
expungement order, and whether such enforcement will be constitutionally permitted.  
 204.  It should be noted that this tort does not generally exist in every state.  See Pasquale, su-
pra note 129, at 519 n.14. 
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operate, must permanently delete any expunged records from their database, 
and frequently—not merely periodically—update any new datasets they re-
ceive (if not already updated by the state).  Failure to comply within a high-
ly limited timeframe set by the state would result in revocation of their li-
cense.  In exchange for a safe-harbor provision, which would shield them 
from potential liability, search engines will be notified by the state to re-
move certain sites, which in turn will be delisted from search results relat-
ing to the individual’s name. 
A right to be forgotten, however, even if limited to expunged criminal 
records, will be deemed too radical under the U.S. legal regime.  Such a 
right necessitates changing the perception of reputation protection, which is 
not within the existing constitutional right to privacy in the United States.205  
As further explained, it would likely be deemed censorship of speech and of 
the press that violates the First Amendment206 and thus, is unlikely to pass 
constitutional scrutiny.  Finally, it would be highly impractical to enforce 
such a right, as many websites holding criminal history records might be 
outside of U.S. legal jurisdiction and hence not within reach.207 
Thus, the main challenge for legislating a right of digital expungement 
is the Constitution.  The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make 
no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech . . . .”208  The risk to speech in 
the digital world is different from the kinetic world.  If a journal published 
an article that described the conviction of a person, expungement would not 
generally cause the destruction of the published article or impose liability 
on its publisher.209  But unlike in the digital world, it would be much more 
difficult for others to find the journal article in the kinetic world.  Hence, 
the free speech argument will only arise when dealing with the digital 
world, as expungement seems irrelevant in many, if not most, analog cases. 
Imposing content restrictions on search engines would endanger free-
dom of speech, and hence, would be unconstitutional.  Expunged criminal 
history will not generally fall into the exceptions to the First Amendment’s 
                                                          
 205.  See JACOBS, supra note 97, at 186. 
 206.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 207.  Personal jurisdiction—a court’s power to exercise its authority over an individual—could 
be challenging, especially with online activities.  For more on personal jurisdiction, see, for exam-
ple, Chris Rojao, Buy It Now: Establishing Personal Jurisdiction over Out-of-State Defendants 
Who Conduct Business Through Online Intermediaries, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1075 (2013).  
 208.  See U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 209.  While in Briscoe v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 483 P.2d 34, 43–44 (Cal. 1971), overruled by 
Gates v. Discovery Commc’ns, 101 P.3d 552 (Cal. 2004), the court held that publication of true, 
but not newsworthy, information concerning the criminal past of a rehabilitated convict could be 
an actionable invasion of privacy, other courts have held the opposite.  See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. 
v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 496–97 (1975). 
 2018] DIGITAL EXPUNGEMENT 373 
 
protection.210  If Congress were to impose restrictions based on the content 
of criminal history, those restrictions must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
state interest of the highest order, and be the least restrictive means availa-
ble to further the articulated interest.211 
Arguably, a state interest exists in the core of expungement statutes—
to reduce recidivism by enabling rehabilitation.  As previously acknowl-
edged in Part I, rehabilitation is an important part of the penal system, and 
expungement is an integral part of ensuring the reintegration to society.  
However, under the current interpretations by U.S. courts, rehabilitation is 
not considered an interest of the highest order.212  Thus, prohibiting publica-
tion of public information, even if it would be relabeled as private infor-
mation after expungement, could not be considered as serving a state inter-
est of the highest order. 
Whether releasing mugshots is mandatory under the Freedom of In-
formation Act, or whether mugshots fall under the exemption for releasing 
personal files, which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
personal privacy, is still unclear.213  But without such clarity, the sole reme-
dy regarding expungement, which is akin to a right to be forgotten in the 
United States, exists in the form of removing mugshots, and is currently 
                                                          
 210.  There are exceptions to the First Amendment’s protection.  For example, defamation, 
incitement, obscenity, and child pornography are not protected speech.  The only relevant speech 
in this instance could be defamation.  Under this argument, publishing information that was ex-
punged is false and widely available to individuals other than the person defamed.  However, 
while publishing criminal history could undermine a need for searching for the truth, it does not 
qualify as false information, even if it was later expunged.  The information is truthful in the sense 
that the details, as described, were true at that time—and thereby not defamatory in nature.  See 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–46 (2002) (“The freedom of speech has its lim-
its; it does not embrace certain categories of speech, including defamation, incitement, obscenity, 
and pornography produced with real children.”); Cox Broad. Corp., 420 U.S. at 491 (holding that 
the state may not impose sanctions on accurate publication obtained from public records); Miller 
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23–24 (1973).  For more on the First Amendment and its relevancy to 
expungement, see generally William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Search for Truth as a First 
Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
 211.  See, e.g., Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979). 
 212.  Gates, 101 P.3d at 557–61 (holding that any state interest in protecting for rehabilitative 
purposes the long-term anonymity of former convicts are not to be considered of the highest or-
der); see also Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989); Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. at 
103 (setting the “highest order” standard); Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 310–12 
(1977). 
 213.  Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 73 F.3d 93, 98 (1996), overruled by De-
troit Free Press Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 829 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2016) (holding that the Free-
dom of Information Act (“FOIA”) exemption does not apply to booking photographs created by 
federal law-enforcement agencies); cf. Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 796 F.3d 
649, 651 (6th Cir. 2015) (urging the full court to reconsider whether Exemption 7(C) applies to 
booking photographs), vacated on reh’g; World Publ’g Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 672 F.3d 825, 
831–32 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding that mugshots are covered by the FOIA exemption for privacy); 
JACOBS, supra note 97, at 197–99. 
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limited.  In Oregon, for instance, individuals can request the removal of 
mugshots if they can prove that they were acquitted or that their record has 
been expunged.214  If legally challenged, however, this law would likely be 
deemed unconstitutional. 
All in all, as long as the United States treats criminal history records as 
public records, regulating the use of these records will be unconstitutional, 
even if they were expunged.  Therefore, policymakers cannot ban publica-
tion of the name of anyone connected to a criminal proceeding, regardless 
of whether it was expunged or not.  An ex-post approach is therefore not 
legally feasible or pragmatic in the United States, and other measures of en-
abling digital expungement are necessary. 
B.  Ex-Ante Expungement 
An ex-ante approach to digital expungement necessitates regulating 
the use of criminal history records in general, regardless of expungement 
statutes.  The market, social norms, and technology, much like with ex-post 
regulation, will be insufficient on their own to aid in digital expungement 
ex-ante.  Legal intervention in this instance would take the form of regulat-
ing the dissemination of information in the first place,215 and not merely 
changing a particular item after the data has changed.  While this form of 
regulation will not be easily achieved, it might be the only pragmatic, con-
stitutional solution available in the United States. 
1.  Ex-Ante Regulation on Data Brokers 
From the perspective of data brokers, there are a few approaches that 
would eliminate, or at least substantially reduce, the dissemination of ex-
punged criminal history records ex-ante.  Naturally, an ex-ante approach 
would require that criminal history records not be disseminated in the first 
place, or be disseminated only after meeting certain requirements. 
An extreme ex-ante approach would be to completely outlaw the prac-
tice of data brokers selling criminal histories.216  With some exceptions, the 
state can either ban the practice directly, or ban the practice indirectly by 
                                                          
 214.  OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.806 (2015). 
 215.  See Murray, supra note 189, at 380 (“Perhaps the best way to limit the effect of criminal 
record history information is to prevent its systematic creation in the first place, even after an in-
dividual encounters the system.”). 
 216.  Unlike the United States, the EU’s approach towards criminal record-based employment 
discrimination is different.  While both do not generally prohibit this form of discrimination, EU 
privacy laws place restrictions on access to and dissemination of conviction (and arrest) infor-
mation.  See James B. Jacobs, European Employment Discrimination Based on Criminal Record 
II—Discretionary Bars, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES RES. CTR. (Jan. 13, 2015), 
http://ccresourcecenter.org/2015/01/13/european-discretionary-employment-discrimination-based-
criminal-record. 
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banning the end use of criminal history records.  It can require end users to 
obtain criminal history records directly from individuals or the state—not 
data brokers.217  However, aside from the potential constitutional constraints 
on this form of regulation,218 this strong-arm strategy is unlikely to succeed 
for three reasons.  First, these commercial vendors play a vital role in the 
market.  They provide an efficient, and relatively cheap, method of conduct-
ing background checks while “reduc[ing] the burden on government 
clerks[,]” which “would otherwise consume public resources.”219  Because 
background checks are mandatory for some employers, and recommended 
for others,220 a wholesale ban on the practice of data brokers is unlikely.221  
Second, without the ability to perform criminal background checks, em-
ployers might increase their indirect screening of potential candidates.  For 
instance, based on the perceived correlation between criminality and race, 
employers may draw harmful inferences about particular ethnic groups.  
Basing their decisions on this form of discrimination could prove even more 
harmful to many individuals.222  Thus, nondiscrimination laws, which for-
bid employers from using criminal records to deny employment or nega-
tively discriminate against an individual based on a criminal record, would 
                                                          
 217.  The exceptions could be several.  For example, when according to employment law, the 
job justifies an inquiry—like public service positions and perhaps some private positions as 
well—employers could disqualify any conviction for abuse of power, e.g., embezzlement and 
bribery, and other misconduct like theft, fraud, extortion, and forgery.  Another example could be 
setting an exemption for specific crimes that might be perceived as crucial for public safety and 
will always remain public, such as sex offenses. 
 218.  The Supreme Court has previously held that distribution of criminal history records by 
private parties is legally permissible and constitutional.  See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. 
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 580–81 (1980); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).  However, it 
should be noted that, at least concerning consumer reports, the District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania ruled that they are considered as commercial speech, and thus entitled to a 
reduced First Amendment protection.  See King v. Gen. Info. Servs., Inc., 903 F. Supp. 2d 303, 
313 (E.D. Pa. 2012); JACOBS, supra note 97, at 179–81. 
 219.  THE COMMERCIAL SALE REPORT, supra note 93, at 1 (quoting COAL. FOR SENSIBLE 
PUB. RECORDS ACCESS, PUBLIC BENEFITS FROM OPEN PUBLIC RECORDS 3, 
http://www.cspra.us/yahoo_site_admin/assets/docs/publicbenefits.31982156.pdf). 
 220.  For example, after September 11, 2001, Congress mandated criminal background checks 
of hazardous material transporters; individuals who would have access to controlled areas of mari-
time facilities or biological agents; transportation personnel; and private security officers.  See 
Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, § 70105, 116 Stat. 2064, 
2073–74 (2002); Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-188, § 201, 116 Stat. 594, 637 (2002); Aviation and Transportation Securi-
ty Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 138, 115 Stat. 597, 639 (2001); Uniting and Strengthening America 
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act) 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 5103a, 115 Stat. 272, 396–97 (2001); Jacobs & Crepet, supra 
note 80, at 209. 
 221.  THE COMMERCIAL SALE REPORT, supra note 93, at 1. 
 222.  For this potential form of statistical discrimination, see Raphael, supra note 92, at 518–
19. 
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be insufficient as they are unenforceable and easily bypassed.223  Finally, 
the government has a substantial interest in the information gathered by 
these private vendors, who often maintain larger datasets of information 
than the government.  Indeed, the government frequently contracts with 
these vendors.224 
A less radical solution would place more limited restrictions on the 
practices of data brokers.  A few states acknowledged the social risks in the 
dissemination of arrest information and placed limitations on data bro-
kers.225  While this Article supports such a move, these restrictions will not 
solve the problem of digital expungement completely because they relate 
only to arrest information.  Furthermore, such policies may still violate the 
First Amendment. 
Another form of potential restriction on data brokers would be to regu-
late the practices of purchasing bulk data and maintaining databases.226  
This solution could improve chances of digital rehabilitation, at least as far 
as data brokers are concerned.  It could ensure that their databases are up-
dated, and that only non-expunged records are disseminated.  While data 
brokers could find other ways to aggregate data,227 this solution is still ra-
ther good for current practices. 
Essentially, while important, placing restrictions on data brokers re-
garding criminal history records is insufficient.  Even if they advance reha-
bilitation to some extent, these restrictions will not extend to online infor-
mation, which would remain easily accessible by end users.  Thus, while 
acknowledging the importance of regulating data brokers, policymakers 
must recognize that this move would be insufficient to fully enable digital 
rehabilitation. 
2.  Ex-Ante Regulation of Information: The Public-Private Records 
Conundrum 
Enabling digital expungement requires the acknowledgment that any 
solution must apply to both data brokers and online sources, as regulating 
only one form of data dissemination would be insufficient to substantially 
                                                          
 223.  See Jacobs, supra note 42, at 412–14. 
 224.  See Solove, supra note 167, at 1151. 
 225.  Several states have precluded the reporting of arrests that did not result in convictions by 
consumer reporting agencies.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1786.18(a)(7) (West 2009); COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 12-14-.3-105.3(1)(e) (2010); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-3-6(a)(5) (LexisNexis 2010); 
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 380-j(a)(1) (McKinney 2012); COMMERCIAL DATA MINING, supra note 
155, at 21–22. 
 226.  See Richard J. Peltz et al., The Arkansas Proposal on Access to Court Records: Upgrad-
ing the Common Law with Electronic Freedom of Information Norms, 59 ARK. L. REV. 555, 626 
(2006); Kessler, supra note 89, at 439. 
 227.  Jagunic, supra note 104, at 181; Kessler, supra note 89, at 439. 
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reduce, and naturally eliminate, the social collateral consequences of ex-
punged criminal records.  A comprehensive solution should begin by rela-
beling criminal history records as private information.  This relabeling ap-
proach will cease dissemination of new information by both data brokers 
and online platforms.  Unfortunately, this solution will not be easily 
achieved due to the deep-rooted perception of criminal history records as 
public information. 
This solution relies on an approach to information privacy much like 
the approach that currently exists in many EU states—extracted from the 
perception of privacy as control over personal information (the privacy-
control paradigm).228  In the EU, criminal history records, including convic-
tions, are conceptualized as personal information entitled to privacy protec-
tion.229  They are not generally available to non-governmental agencies, ex-
cept for the record subject.230  In many instances, identifying information in 
criminal cases is anonymized in published judicial opinions.231  The United 
States, on the other hand, considers criminal history records as public in-
formation “infused with public interest.”232  Furthermore, any government 
records deemed public are accessible by the Freedom of Information Act 
(“FOIA”).233  Enacted in 1966, FOIA was designed to “implement ‘a gen-
eral philosophy of full agency disclosure’” of government records.234  Un-
der FOIA, federal agencies are required to make their opinions and policy 
statements generally available to the public, and to make other records 
“promptly available” to any person who requests them.235 
The U.S. treatment of criminal history records as public information is 
rooted within the perception that court records should be open to the pub-
                                                          
 228.  First coined by Alan Westin in 1967, the privacy-control paradigm has gained much 
scholarly attention in the last few decades.  See generally ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND 
FREEDOM (1970).  For more on the privacy-control paradigm, see generally ANN CAVOUKIAN & 
DON TAPSCOTT, WHO KNOWS: SAFEGUARDING YOUR PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD 9 
(1997); Paul M. Schwartz, Internet Privacy and the State, 32 CONN. L. REV. 815, 816 (2000); 
Paul M. Schwartz, Property, Privacy, and Personal Data, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2055, 2059 (2004) 
(discussing privacy as a public good capable of generating commercial opportunities). 
 229.  See JACOBS, supra note 97, at 163. 
 230.  Id. at 159. 
 231.  Id. 
 232.  Id. at 188; see also Kevin Lapp, American Criminal Record Exceptionalism, 14 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 303, 308 (2016).  
 233.  See Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).  Note that the Act was revised several times 
since its enactment in 1966.  See Freedom of Information Act, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 
(1974); Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, 90 Stat. 1241 (1976); Freedom of 
Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, §§ 1801–04, 100 Stat. 3207-48-50 (1986); 
Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat. 
3048 (1996). 
 234.  U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 754 
(1989) (quoting Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360 (1976)). 
 235.  5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2)–(3) (2012). 
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lic.236  Unless confidentiality is required by law, or a case is sealed under 
the specific discretion of government officials, court records are public.237  
There are three main reasons that the U.S. legal system keeps criminal his-
tory records open to the public: public safety, transparency, and theories of 
punishment. 
The first reason is public safety.  Criminal activity is perceived as a le-
gitimate concern to the public.238  Such legitimate concerns extend to any 
public records and documents.239  Even alleged criminal activity falls within 
this public safety argument, as presumably the public should be warned 
against potential offenders prior to hiring them, leasing their property to 
them, or even simply dating them.  Thus, because non-conviction arrest da-
ta could be relevant in assessing risk by the public, the state must warn the 
public against any alleged criminal conduct even if it did not result in crim-
inal proceedings.  Expungement is treated similarly.  While expungement 
makes these records publicly unavailable, it does not change their public na-
ture.240 
The public safety argument is generally unpersuasive, particularly re-
garding non-conviction and expunged records.  Non-conviction arrest da-
ta—which is beyond the purposes of this Article’s examination—is general-
ly irrelevant to the public and should not be treated as public information.  
Arrests are in no way proof of guilt, and the presumption of innocence 
should be guaranteed.  Otherwise, mere arrests would carry harsh collateral 
consequences even without indictment or conviction.  Thus, the social col-
lateral consequences must not result from an arrest, and if they do, they 
should be reserved for conduct that is deemed especially crucial for public 
safety such as sex offenses and violent crimes.  Expunged records should be 
treated similarly.  Because trial courts already balance state and private in-
                                                          
 236.  Callanan, supra note 67, at 1291 (“Public access to the court system is one of the most 
basic rights within the United States’ legal system.”); cf. Solove, supra note 167, at 1155 (men-
tioning that early U.S. courts which followed the English practice of limiting access to documents 
was limited only to litigation purposes). 
 237.  Solove, supra note 167, at 1153–54, 1159. 
 238.  Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975). 
 239.  Id. at 495 (“Public records by their very nature are of interest to those concerned with the 
administration of government, and a public benefit is performed by the reporting of the true con-
tents of the records by the media.”); Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978) 
(“It is clear that the courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public rec-
ords and documents, including judicial records and documents.”). 
 240.  See Kessler, supra note 89, at 411 (“[T]he expungement of a record does not alter its 
public nature.”); see also Dickerson v. New Banner Inst., Inc., 460 U.S. 103, 115 (1983), super-
seded by statute, Firearms Owners’ Protection Act, 100 Pub. L. No. 99-308, 100 Stat. 449, as rec-
ognized in Logan v. United States, 552 U.S. 23, 127–28 (2007) (“[E]xpunction under state law 
does not alter the historical fact of the conviction.”); Nunez v. Pachman, 578 F.3d 228, 231 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (holding that expunged information is “never truly private” because the criminal record 
is publicly available prior to expungement). 
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terests when determining whether expungement is appropriate,241 not only 
is the public safety argument irrelevant, it is harmful.  Successful expunge-
ment could actually improve public safety by reducing recidivism.242 
Moreover, the public safety argument could be achieved by less re-
strictive means already deployed in other jurisdictions.  In some jurisdic-
tions, criminal history records are kept private, with an exception that al-
lows, and even mandates in certain circumstances, individuals to provide a 
“certificate of good conduct” or “lack of a criminal record.”243  Individuals 
are able to request that governmental agencies conduct a local or state crim-
inal records search and provide them with a document reflecting that there 
is no history of a criminal record.  This process allows individuals to exam-
ine whether their expunged record appears in the database of the govern-
mental agency.  Yet the agency may still provide vital information to inter-
ested parties and thus address the public safety concerns to a great extent. 
The second reason for maintaining open court records is transparency.  
Transparency, or openness, is generally perceived as an essential compo-
nent of good governance,244 and is considered important to allow the public 
and press to exercise their First Amendment rights.245  Transparency is de-
signed to enable public oversight of both governmental agencies and courts’ 
actions.  The public can serve as a “watchdog” and ensure that these bodies 
do not exercise their power beyond their legal mandate.246  If someone is 
unlawfully arrested or prosecuted, the fourth and fifth estates’247 involve-
ment in the process is considered important for maintaining the proper 
checks and balances essential to the function of liberal-democratic states.  
                                                          
 241.  Murray, supra note 189, at 368. 
 242.  For a summary of research on whether having a criminal record increases recidivism ra-
ther than protects the public, see Lapp, supra note 232, at 315, 320. 
 243.  A similar approach currently exists in other jurisdictions like the EU and Israel.  See 
JACOBS, supra note 97, at 159; Jacobs & Blitsa, supra note 78, at 194–95.  Israeli law imposes 
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bilitation of Offenders Law, 5741–1981, § 22, 35 LSI 398 (1980–81) (Isr.).  
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tates of the realm’ . . . .”  William H. Dutton, The Fifth Estate Emerging Through the Network of 
Networks, 27 PROMETHEUS 1, 1 (2009).  The fourth estate is traditionally attributed to the media, 
while the fifth estate could be attributed to any networked individuals.  See id. at 2; STEPHEN D. 
COOPER, WATCHING THE WATCHDOG: BLOGGERS AS THE FIFTH ESTATE (2006). 
 380 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 77:337 
 
This transparency approach advocates fairness, integrity, and competence of 
enforcement agencies, judges, and courts.248  In addition, transparency can 
be crucial for learning about public officials and candidates for public of-
fice.249 
Oversight, however, could also be achieved within a perception of 
criminal history records as private: criminal proceedings could remain 
mostly open to the public and media to attend; lawyers are present almost 
from the moment of arrest; and defendants have a right to transcripts of the 
proceedings and to have their cases reviewed by an appellate court.250  
Moreover, oversight of the judicial system does not necessarily require pub-
lication of the name of the defendant.251  Even without identifying infor-
mation, the public can still have access to the relevant information such as 
the judge’s, prosecutor’s, and defense attorney’s names, and the entire court 
proceeding.252 
The third reason for maintaining open court records relies on theories 
of punishment.  While rehabilitation endorses categorizing criminal history 
records as private, both deterrence and retribution theories could imply oth-
erwise.  Under the deterrence theory, keeping criminal history records pub-
lic is essential for deterring potential offenders, as they would (allegedly) 
fear the eternal nature of their criminal activity.253  Retribution could sug-
gest that ex-offenders should be held accountable for their tainted biography 
as a form of punishment.254 
The reasoning of punishment theories is also highly unpersuasive.  The 
public availability of information does not necessarily lead to deterrence.  
Along with general criticism of deterrence theory in criminal sanctioning,255 
empirical research on the deterrent effects of community notification laws, 
specifically those for sex offenders often referred to as “Megan’s Laws,”256 
suggest that not only did these laws fail to advance deterrence, but they in-
                                                          
 248.  See JACOBS, supra note 97, at 191. 
 249.  Solove, supra note 167, at 1173. 
 250.  See Lapp, supra note 232, at 307. 
 251.  Obscuring identity does exist in American law, especially when dealing with juvenile 
records, and it seems that this practice does not undermine oversight on these proceedings.  See id. 
at 317–21 (describing the “Juvenile Exception”). 
 252.  See Callanan, supra note 67, at 1305. 
 253.  See JACOBS, supra note 97, at 155.  But see Lapp, supra note 232, at 314–15 (asserting 
that “the prevalence of offending” is more related to age than any other factor).   
 254.  See JACOBS, supra note 97, at 299. 
 255.  Deterrence theory has been widely criticized over the years.  See, e.g., Dan M. Kahan, 
The Theory of Value Dilemma: A Critique of the Economic Analysis of Criminal Law, 1 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 643 (2004). 
 256.  “‘Megan’s Laws’ [usually] require the maintenance of databases of information about 
prior sex offenders and disclosure of their identities and where they live.”  Solove, supra note 167, 
at 1148.  See generally Jane A. Small, Who Are the People in Your Neighborhood? Due Process, 
Public Protection, and Sex Offender Notification Laws, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1451, 1459–60 (1999). 
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creased the chances of recidivism.257  Retribution is equally uncompelling.  
Making the information public contributes to the punishment of the offend-
er beyond the prescribed sentence.  Even if we accept relying on deterrence 
and retribution as reasons for keeping criminal records public, these pur-
poses should be weighed against the objective of rehabilitation and other 
goals of criminal law like reducing recidivism. 
Along with the reasons discussed above, the American approach to-
wards the publication of criminal records is rooted in the Constitution.  The 
First Amendment grants the public a right to print and broadcast news about 
crimes and criminal justice events, including arrests, indictments, and tri-
als.258  It protects the right to publish information obtained from govern-
ment records.259  Another example is the Sixth Amendment, which grants 
criminal defendants the right to a public trial.260  Under this right, there is a 
strong societal interest in public access to court proceedings.261 
There are a few exceptions to the American approach towards the pub-
lication of criminal records, as court proceedings are not always open,262 
and dissemination of personal information is not always permissible.263  
FOIA, for example, permits agencies to refuse requests for “records or in-
formation compiled for law enforcement purposes” if public release “could 
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal 
privacy.”264  Currently, however, it seems that criminal history records do 
not fall within this exemption.265 
There are also some exceptions to the general availability of criminal 
history records at the state level.  A few states regulate the initial dissemina-
                                                          
 257.  For such empirical analysis, see J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Regis-
tration and Notification Laws Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 161 (2011). 
 258.  See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 516–18 (1984) (Stevens, J., concur-
ring); Jacobs, supra note 42, at 410. 
 259.  See Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 
U.S. 97, 105–06 (1979) (holding that a West Virginia statute, that made it a crime to publish the 
name of any child connected with a juvenile proceeding without court permission, was unconstitu-
tional because maintaining the juvenile’s anonymity as a means of promoting rehabilitation is not 
an “interest of the highest order”); Okla. Publ’g Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (per 
curiam); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 495 (1975). 
 260.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For an interpretation of this right, see Press-Enter. Co. v. Supe-
rior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 7 (1986). 
 261.  Jacobs, supra note 42, at 410. 
 262.  Press-Enter., 478 U.S. at 13–14 (mentioning exceptions that allow the closing of any 
court hearing); Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978) (ruling that a court 
can limit access to court records if it believes that access to those records “ha[s] become a vehicle 
for improper purposes”).  
 263.  For examples of U.S. laws that prohibit the dissemination of information under certain 
circumstances, see JACOBS, supra note 97, at 186–87. 
 264.  5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (2012). 
 265.  See JACOBS, supra note 97, at 173–75. 
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tion of criminal history records by limiting disclosure of information to the 
private sector.  The State of Texas, for example, placed a limitation on the 
publication and sharing of certain criminal records with the private sec-
tor.266  Some states have also differentiated between conviction and non-
conviction data, and restricted dissemination accordingly.267  Still, most 
states, and the federal government, generally take the approach that criminal 
history records are public information. 
Generally, the emergence of new technologies necessitates rethinking 
the regulation of public records,268 including criminal history records.  The 
openness approach toward criminal history records could be overcome by 
findings showing that “closure is essential to preserve higher values and is 
narrowly tailored to serve” those values.269  Relabeling all criminal history 
records as private will likely be held unconstitutional.  Any proposal to re-
label all criminal history records would probably not, therefore, be narrowly 
tailored because it encompasses certain sensitive criminal histories, which 
should remain public. The interests in making expunged records private 
could override other interests, as this Article argues. 
This Article suggests taking a graduated approach toward criminal his-
tory records, which would be narrowly tailored to serve the interests of re-
habilitation-by-expungement.  This approach could aid in reducing the col-
lateral consequences faced by those who were never convicted or who are 
eligible for reform.  This graduated approach would require reexamining 
current criminal offenses and relabeling each based on the potential collat-
eral consequences of making the record of a conviction under the offense 
publicly available.  Beyond the necessity of labeling criminal rehabilitation 
as a state interest of the highest order—a change in perception that would 
not be easily achieved—this approach would require a few steps. 
The first step would be to make non-conviction criminal history rec-
ords private.  Criminal charges should not be considered as an indication of 
a defendant’s guilt.  At the very least, if the rationales behind keeping crim-
inal records publicly available prevail, the United States could use pseudo-
nyms for criminal proceedings prior to conviction.  This would allow the 
public to be notified of proceedings while keeping the subject safe from 
                                                          
 266.  See GAEBLER, supra note 41, at 26–28. 
 267.  Kentucky, for example, limits disclosure of non-conviction data to criminal justice agen-
cies and research purposes—unless otherwise authorized by statute, ordinance, executive order, or 
court order.  502 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 30:060 (2009).  Louisiana limits the dissemination of reports 
containing non-conviction records.  LA. STAT. ANN. § 15:548 (2012).  In Nebraska, the notation 
of arrest is removed from the public record under certain circumstances.  NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-
3523 (2008). 
 268.  See Solove, supra note 167, at 1140. 
 269.  Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1986) (quoting Press-Enter. Co. v. 
Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984)). 
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collateral consequences absent conviction.270  In rare cases, where there is a 
strong public interest in publication of a non-conviction criminal record that 
is evident and overrides the interest of rehabilitation, there could be full 
public disclosure.  Obviously, it would be difficult to prevent individuals 
who, for example, witnessed their neighbor’s arrest from reporting it online 
or by any other means.  Still, this approach could dramatically decrease the 
publicity of these events. 
The second step would directly relate to expungement.  After convic-
tion, the state would differentiate between offenses that are eligible for ex-
pungement and those that are not.  The latter will become public immedi-
ately.  Specific offenses that require community notification, like sex 
offenses, could remain public.271  As for the former, the information will 
generally remain private, accessible only to governmental agencies.  Upon 
release from prison, the state would decide whether the public interest ne-
cessitates the release of such information, depending mostly on the sub-
ject’s eligibility for expungement. 
This approach could also integrate other exceptions to the general rule.  
For example, if the state decided that some types of work, like working with 
children and other vulnerable populations, require employees who have 
never been convicted of a crime (even if expunged), then policymakers 
could create exceptions.  These employers could file a request for the crim-
inal history records of an individual, and the state would search a database 
tailored to meet these needs. 
As long as a right to digital expungement does not exist, and policy-
makers fail to implement a graduated approach to criminal history records, 
other methods of decreasing the potential collateral consequences that arise 
from digital technology must be considered.  Policymakers could, for ex-
ample, influence employers, landlords, and educational institutions to hire, 
lease property to, and enroll students with expunged criminal histories by 
granting monetary and non-monetary incentives.272  Mainly, acknowledg-
ment of the problem must be deeply rooted in the justice system.  Infor-
                                                          
 270.  See Callanan, supra note 67, at 1292 (giving the example of using pseudonyms in adop-
tion cases). 
 271.  See supra note 256. 
 272.  An example of such suggested incentive programs is extending tax incentives to employ-
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mation about collateral consequences in general,273 and in the digital age in 
particular, is essential in reducing their negative impact.274  To ensure the 
possibility of reintegration into society, policymakers, the judiciary, and in-
dividuals in society must acknowledge the impact of distributed networks 
and the wide availability of information on individuals with criminal histo-
ry. 
On a more abstract level, this Article also strongly encourages policy-
makers to reconsider alternative corrective measures for criminal law.  They 
should generally increase the availability of expungement in the kinetic 
world.  Judges should also consider the possibility of collateral consequenc-
es, which could be enhanced in the digital era, when deciding the scope of 
punishment.  Defendants need to understand better the consequences result-
ing from a guilty plea.275  In essence, while many courts rule differently, 
collateral consequences are punishment, especially in an era where infor-
mation is widely available and accessible to everyone at any given time. 
Overall, a right to digital expungement is clearly a necessity.  While 
the U.S. legal system places many limitations on the regulation of content, 
policymakers must reconsider the need to make criminal history records 
public.  A graduated approach to digital expungement is perhaps the only 
practical way to reduce the social collateral consequences of a criminal rec-
ord in the United States, and it requires the reconceptualization of criminal 
history records as private information as the default, with set exceptions for 
public safety. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Rehabilitation in America is profoundly at risk.  While prior to the dig-
ital age, the architecture of the kinetic world made criminal history records 
effectively invisible to the public, the digital age made them almost eternal.  
With the easy and wide availability of information via distributed networks, 
it would be presumptuous to assume that legal measures in liberal democra-
cies could eliminate all traces of records that were expunged.  People can 
always talk, text, post on social media or blogs, and find other ways to 
                                                          
 273.  See Chin & Holmes, supra note 32, at 699 (arguing that most attorneys are not required 
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communicate regarding the criminal activity of an individual.  The practices 
of data brokers and online services like mugshot websites make this infor-
mation more readily available and accessible to anyone.  As regulating con-
tent in the United States is almost an impossible task due to the First 
Amendment, the only pragmatic method for reducing the social collateral 
consequences of criminal history records in the United States is to recon-
ceptualize criminal history records, or at least large portions of them, as pri-
vate information by default. 
Even this reconceptualization is not easily achieved.  The U.S. percep-
tion of criminal history records as public is rooted within the legal system.  
Under this perception, from the moment of arrest, individuals are bound to 
have a publicly available criminal record.  But acknowledgment of the neg-
ative effects of the digital environment on criminal rehabilitation must not 
be overlooked.  Expungement must be revisited and revised to address the 
challenges of digital technology to rehabilitation.  Failure to acknowledge 
the importance of digital expungement could have dire consequences, not 
merely on those individuals with a criminal history, but also on related, 
wholly innocent members of society.  Ignoring this problem will likely in-
crease recidivism as individuals are effectively barred from reintegrating 
into society.  Essentially, digital technology should not lead to the demise 
of criminal rehabilitation, and policymakers must incorporate methods of 
ensuring a right to digital expungement. 
